Signaling Game
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2021 ◽  
pp. 095162982110611
Author(s):  
Satoshi Kasamatsu ◽  
Daiki Kishishita

This paper aims to investigate the possibility that electoral campaigning transmits truthful information in a situation where campaigning has a direct persuasive effect on a subset of the electorate called “naïve voters.” To this end, we construct a multi-sender signaling game in which an incumbent and a challenger decide whether to focus on policy or ability in electoral campaigning, and a media outlet then decides whether to gather news. Voters are divided into sophisticated and naïve voters. We demonstrate that a candidate's strategy regarding their issues of focus (campaign messages) can signal his or her private information. Specifically, negative campaigning against the incumbent's ability signals the incumbent's low ability in all separating equilibria. It is also noteworthy that separating equilibria exist only when sophisticated and naïve voters coexist. This implies that a fraction of naïve voters has a non-monotonic effect on the possibility of transmitting truthful information.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoning Zhang ◽  
Hengwei Zhang ◽  
Chenwei Li ◽  
Pengyu Sun ◽  
Zhilin Liu ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Joseph Rekus ◽  
Yixiao Jiang

This paper models the college admission process as a signaling game between the admissions office and a pool of heterogeneous applicants characterized by academic abilities and demonstrated interest. In the screening and selection process, applicants attempt to signal their private information through their performance on a standardized test (for academic abilities) and interview (for demonstrated interest).  We show, under general conditions, that a separating equilibrium exists in which it is incentive-compatible for applicants to reveal their characteristics truthfully, and thus the admissions office does not fall victim to the problem of information asymmetry. Furthermore, we delineate how this equilibrium can be induced by setting appropriate “scoring” thresholds associated with standardized tests and interviews.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 1027
Author(s):  
Vijeth Hebbar ◽  
Cédric Langbort

Tacit communication can be exploited in human robot interaction (HRI) scenarios to achieve desirable outcomes. This paper models a particular search and rescue (SAR) scenario as a modified asymmetric rendezvous game, where limited signaling capabilities are present between the two players—rescuer and rescuee. We model our situation as a co-operative Stackelberg signaling game, where the rescuer acts as a leader in signaling its intent to the rescuee. We present an efficient game-theoretic approach to obtain the optimal signaling policy to be employed by the rescuer. We then robustify this approach to uncertainties in the rescue topology and deviations in rescuee behavior. The paper thus introduces a game-theoretic framework to model an HRI scenario with implicit communication capacity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1955 (1) ◽  
pp. 012115
Author(s):  
Xiaoning Zhang ◽  
Hengwei Zhang ◽  
Pengyu Sun ◽  
Jindong Wang

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 751-764
Author(s):  
Abdullah Aydeger ◽  
Mohammad Hossein Manshaei ◽  
Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman ◽  
Kemal Akkaya

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