Syntactical and semantical properties of simple type theory

1960 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 305-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Schütte

In my paper [10] I introduced the syntactical concepts “positive part” and “negative part” of logical formulas in first-order predicate calculus. These concepts make it possible to establish logical systems on inference rules similar to Gentzen's inference rules but without using the concept “sequent” and without needing Gentzen's structural inference rules. Proof-theoretical investigations of several formal systems based on positive and negative parts are published in [11]. In this paper I consider a similar formal system of simple type theory.A syntactical concept of “strict derivability” results from the formal system in [10] by generalization of the axioms and inference rules from first to higher-order predicate calculus and by addition of inference rules for set abstraction by means of a λ-symbol which allows us to form set expressions of arbitrary types from well-formed formulas.

1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-226
Author(s):  
Satoko Titani

In [4], I introduced a quasi-Boolean algebra, and showed that in a formal system of simple type theory, from which the cut rule is omitted, wffs form a quasi-Boolean algebra, and that the cut-elimination theorem can be formulated in algebraic language. In this paper we use the result of [4] to prove the cut-elimination theorem in simple type theory. The theorem was proved by M. Takahashi [2] in 1967 by using the concept of Schütte's semivaluation. We use maximal ideals of a quasi-Boolean algebra instead of semivaluations.The logical system we are concerned with is a modification of Schütte's formal system of simple type theory in [1] into Gentzen style.Inductive definition of types.0 and 1 are types.If τ1, …, τn are types, then (τ1, …, τn) is a type.Basic symbols.a1τ, a2τ, … for free variables of type τ.x1τ, x2τ, … for bound variables of type τ.An arbitrary number of constants of certain types.An arbitrary number of function symbols with certain argument places.


1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 211-213
Author(s):  
Nissim Francez

1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 204-219
Author(s):  
Christian Hort ◽  
Horst Osswald

There are two concepts of standard/nonstandard models in simple type theory.The first concept—we might call it the pragmatical one—interprets type theory as a first order logic with countably many sorts of variables: the variables for the urelements of type 0,…, the n-ary relational variables of type (τ1, …, τn) with arguments of type (τ1,…,τn), respectively. If A ≠ ∅ then 〈Aτ〉 is called a model of type logic, if A0 = A and . 〈Aτ〉 is called full if, for every τ = (τ1,…,τn), . The variables for the urelements range over the elements of A and the variables of type (τ1,…, τn) range over those subsets of which are elements of . The theory Th(〈Aτ〉) is the set of all closed formulas in the language which hold in 〈Aτ〉 under natural interpretation of the constants. If 〈Bτ〉 is a model of Th(〈Aτ〉), then there exists a sequence 〈fτ〉 of functions fτ: Aτ → Bτ such that 〈fτ〉 is an elementary embedding from 〈Aτ〉 into 〈Bτ〉. 〈Bτ〉 is called a nonstandard model of 〈Aτ〉, if f0 is not surjective. Otherwise 〈Bτ〉 is called a standard model of 〈Aτ〉.This first concept of model theory in type logic seems to be preferable for applications in model theory, for example in nonstandard analysis, since all nice properties of first order model theory (completeness, compactness, and so on) are preserved.


1955 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. H. Löb

If Σ is any standard formal system adequate for recursive number theory, a formula (having a certain integer q as its Gödel number) can be constructed which expresses the proposition that the formula with Gödel number q is provable in Σ. Is this formula provable or independent in Σ? [2].One approach to this problem is discussed by Kreisel in [4]. However, he still leaves open the question whether the formula (Ex)(x, a), with Gödel-number a, is provable or not. Here (x, y) is the number-theoretic predicate which expresses the proposition that x is the number of a formal proof of the formula with Gödel-number y.In this note we present a solution of the previous problem with respect to the system Zμ [3] pp. 289–294, and, more generally, with respect to any system whose set of theorems is closed under the rules of inference of the first order predicate calculus, and satisfies the subsequent five conditions, and in which the function (k, l) used below is definable.The notation and terminology is in the main that of [3] pp. 306–326, viz. if is a formula of Zμ containing no free variables, whose Gödel number is a, then ({}) stands for (Ex)(x, a) (read: the formula with Gödel number a is provable in Zμ); if is a formula of Zμ containing a free variable, y say, ({}) stands for (Ex)(x, g(y)}, where g(y) is a recursive function such that for an arbitrary numeral the value of g() is the Gödel number of the formula obtained from by substituting for y in throughout. We shall, however, depart trivially from [3] in writing (), where is an arbitrary numeral, for (Ex){x, ).


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