The United States and the International Criminal Court

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Scheffer

The United States has had and will continue to have a compelling interest in the establishment of a permanent international criminal court (ICC). Such an international court, so long contemplated and so relevant in a world burdened widi mass murderers, can both deter and punish diose who might escape justice in national courts. Since 1995, the question for the Clinton administration has never been whether there should be an international criminal court, but rather what kind of court it should be in order to operate efficiently, effectively and appropriately within a global system that also requires our constant vigilance to protect international peace and security. At the same time, the United States has special responsibilities and special exposure to political controversy over our actions. This factor cannot be taken lightly when issues of international peace and security are at stake. We are called upon to act, sometimes at great risk, far more than any other nation. This is a reality in the international system.

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Bogdan

AbstractState-parties to the International Criminal Court Statute have a general obligation to cooperate with the Court. The duty to cooperate represents the functional cornerstone of the Court's existence. A narrow exception to this duty is contained in Article 98 of the Statute, which provides for limited circumstances in which the Court must refrain from seeking a surrender of an individual to the Court. Following rules of treaty interpretation, as well as an examination of the legislative history of the ICC Statute, the article explores the scope of Article 98, the provision the United States relied on in concluding a series of bilateral agreements that are primarily aimed at preventing the surrender of any U.S. nationals to the ICC. The article considers the issue of what impact, if any, the agreements have in the context of extradition, and the U.S.' legal ability to fulfill the commitments made in the "Article 98" agreements.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUDITH KELLEY

What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances two classic arguments that typically are difficult to substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly normative, and international commitments do not just screen states; they also constrain.


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