Hermeneutics & Constitutional FaithConstitutional Faith. By Sanford Levinson Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial Power. By Gary L. McDowell Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay. By Michael J. Perry Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law. By Mark Tushnet

Polity ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-179
Author(s):  
Ronald Kahn
Author(s):  
Kirk Jeremy

This chapter examines the notion of ‘justiciability’ in Australia. In this chapter, justiciability is understood as referring to issues considered appropriate and capable of being subject to judicial resolution and relief. The primary function of courts is to resolve legal disputes. Constitutional law questions, of their nature, tend to overlap with political, social, moral, and economic issues. Disputes in these areas may raise issues which courts are not well-suited to resolve. Further, there may be a concern about whether a case presents a real controversy for determination which is in dispute between the parties before the court, which is appropriately raised by those parties, and/or which is capable of being quelled in whole or part by judicial remedy. Such issues are linked in the Australian constitutional context to the interwoven requirements that there be a ‘matter’ before the court capable of determination by exercise of the ‘judicial power of the Commonwealth’.


Author(s):  
Teoría y Realidad Constitucional

En esta encuesta un grupo de Catedráticos de Derecho Constitucional contestan un conjunto de preguntas sobre la independencia del Poder Judicial en el Estado de Derecho, relativas a las amenazas que existen a esa independencia; las preguntas abordan temas relativos al Consejo General del Poder Judicial, la figura del aforamiento, el régimen del Ministerio Fiscal y el derecho de gracia, entre otros.In this academic survey a group of Constitutional Law Professors answer some questions about the independence of the Judicial Power and the Rule of Law and about the threats to this independence; the questions approach topics relative to the Judicial Power government, the procedural privileges, the regime of the Attorney General’s office and judicial pardon or grant of clemency.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1258-1282
Author(s):  
Rehan Abeyratne

Abstract This article, a contribution to a symposium on dominion constitutionalism, looks at sovereignty in Ceylon’s Dominion period (1948–1972). While the Ceylon Constitution has been the subject of in-depth historical and sociopolitical study, it has received less attention from legal scholars. This article hopes to fill that gap. It analyzes Ceylon Supreme Court and Privy Council judgments from this era on both rights-based and structural questions of constitutional law. In each area, sovereignty-related concerns influenced the judicial approach and case outcomes. On fundamental rights, both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council adopted a cautious approach, declining to invalidate legislation that had discriminatory effects on minority communities. This reluctance to entrench fundamental rights resulted, at least in part, from judges’ undue deference to the Ceylon Parliament, which was wrongly looked upon like its all-powerful British progenitor. On constitutional structure, the Ceylon Supreme Court deferred to Parliament even when legislation encroached into the judicial realm. The Privy Council, though, was not so passive. It upheld a separate, inviolable judicial power that Parliament could not legislate away. But by asserting itself as a check on legislative power, the Council—as a foreign judicial body intervening in Ceylonese affairs—stoked concerns that Ceylon was less than fully sovereign, which ultimately ended Dominion status.


1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 597
Author(s):  
John A. Coleman ◽  
Michael John Perry

1908 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-561
Author(s):  
W. F. Dodd

The distinction between constitutions and statutes is a fundamental one in American constitutional law, but it is a matter of surprise that no one has yet attempted to discuss this distinction in its historical origins. Brinton Coxe in his Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation has traced the development of the doctrine that statutes in conflict with the constitution may be declared invalid by the courts. Judge J. A. Jameson in his Treatise on Constitutional Conventions has given a brief account of the adoption of the first State constitutions; but no one has yet studied the adoption of these constitutions in order to find what were the theories of their framers as to the distinction between constitutions and statutes.By the term constitution, as used both in England and America before the Revolution, was understood the general and more permanent principles upon which government is based. The term was used on both sides of the Atlantic to signify something superior to legislative enactments, and the principles of the constitution were appealed to as beyond the control of the British parliament.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. e41891211113
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara ◽  
Luthfi Marfungah

The Covid-19 pandemic in different countries, particularly in terms of performing their duties and functions, has both direct and indirect implications on the judiciary. This paper calls for a contrast between the implementation of law emergencies in the United States and the judiciary's reflection in Indonesia. The study uses the comparative approach in constitutional law to provide advice, which needs to be avoided in the Indonesian constitutional law by researching legal material and procedures in other countries' constitutional law. This article concludes that the Law of Judicial Power and the Law of Procedure in Indonesia require strict legal material on how procedural law does not give delegates too much technical, regulatory authority to each court during the time of crisis and has the potential to create unequal policies in the future to deal with judicial emergencies so that regulation is necessary.


Author(s):  
Pal Ruma

This chapter examines how the issue of separation of powers is treated in the Indian Constitution. More specifically, it considers whether the separation of powers is a principle in the constitutional law of India and if so, what sort of doctrine of separation of powers is embraced by the Indian Constitution. The chapter begins with an overview of the three models of separation of powers articulated in the Indian Constitution, along with the constitutional provisions showing the functional overlap between the executive, legislature, and judiciary. It then turns to a discussion of the legislative branch’s judicial powers under the Constitution, as well as its control of the judiciary; the executive’s administration, legislative, and judicial functions; and the courts’ judicial power and independence. Finally, it looks at the allocation of powers relating to governance to autonomous bodies such as the Election Commission and the Comptroller and Auditor-General.


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