The State Department and Sun Yat-sen: American Policy and the Revolutionary Disintegration of China, 1920-1924

1977 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian T. George
Author(s):  
Taylor St John

This chapter analyzes the purposes that American officials ascribe to investor–state arbitration in their investment treaties, using internal documents from all pre-NAFTA American investment treaty negotiations. Officials drafting the initial US model treaty in the late 1970s saw ISDS as a narrow tool to protect investment, but a decade later, it was reimagined as a way to lock in domestic liberalization reforms in former Soviet or Latin American states. Similarly, the American investment treaty program was not intended to facilitate outward investments, but rhetoric has changed: in the early 1990s, additional investment was implied to treaty partners, before and after these years officials noted that treaties and ISDS do not necessarily lead to additional investment. Finally, while access to arbitration became a pillar of American policy, at first investor access to ICSID caused the State Department frustration and endangered US strategic interests.


Author(s):  
Dayna L. Barnes

This chapter looks at Harry Truman's administration during the postwar period. The major development of this period was the widespread acceptance within the administration of the policy planners' ideas and aims. This was true even though the plans were altered in response to events and new voices in summer and fall of 1945. The course of events in the early Truman administration opened the door for the recommendations of a small group of Japan specialists in the State Department to become American policy. In the transition from war to victory, these recommendations were approved as SWNCC 150/4, the document that was sent to occupation administrators to guide American actions in defeated Japan.


1944 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-136
Author(s):  
Dexter Perkins
Keyword(s):  

1995 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piero Gleijeses

AbstractA comprehensive study of the available documents about the Bay of Pigs, including many that have been declassified within the last eighteen months, and extensive interviews with the protagonists in the CIA, the White House and the State Department lead me to conclude that the disastrous operation was launched not simply because Kennedy was poorly served by his young staff and was the captive of his campaign rhetoric, nor simply because of the hubris of the CIA. Rather, the Bay of Pigs was approved because the CIA and the White House assumed they were speaking the same language when, in fact, they were speaking in utterly different tongues.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document