Board Composition and Control of Shareholder Voting Rights in the Banking Industry

1997 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Whidbee
Keyword(s):  
Banking Industry ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
And Control

scholarly journals Evolution of ownership and control in Italian IPO firms

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Rigamonti
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

This article examines the evolution of ownership of cash flow rights and control of voting rights of firms that went public in Italy over the period 1985-2005. At the IPO, the ownership structure does not evolve towards a dispersed one. Even 10 years after the flotation, the initial ultimate shareholder retains the majority of voting rights. Though control is valuable, original owners do not systematically set up structures that dissociate cash flow from voting rights.

Can States Promote Minority Representation? Assessing the Effects of the California Voting Rights Act

2019 ◽  
pp. 107808741989685
Author(s):  
Loren Collingwood ◽  
Sean Long
Keyword(s):  
Local Level ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Average Treatment Effect ◽  
City Council ◽  
Voting Rights Act ◽  
Minority Representation ◽  
City Councils ◽  
Before And After ◽  
And Control ◽  
The City

One goal of the California Voting Rights Act (CVRA) is to broaden representation in largely White-controlled city councils state-wide by incentivizing cities to shift council electoral jurisdictions from at-large to single-member districts. However, little research has investigated whether the CVRA helped contribute to increased minority representation at the city level. This article employs matching and difference-in-difference methods to determine whether cities that switched to district elections as a result of the CVRA enhanced city council diversification. By comparing matched treatment and control group’s racial composition of city councils before and after fully switching from at-large to district election jurisdictions, we estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of city switching on minority city council representation at 10% to 12%. Further analysis reveals treatment effects are larger among cities with larger shares of Latinos (21%). Thus, states seeking to increase local-level minority representation should consider policies similar to those found in the CVRA.

Shareholder voting rights

2012 ◽  
pp. 467-509
Author(s):  
Andreas Cahn ◽  
David C. Donald
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rights ◽  
Shareholder Voting
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