U. S. State Legislative Committees: Structure, Procedural Efficiency, and Party Control

1982 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne L. Francis ◽  
James W. Riddlesperger
2022 ◽  
pp. 24-51

This chapter explores the history and operation of state legislatures. The urban-rural divide characterizes stark political and social differences that fuel legislative behavior. The content of public policies across the United States is influenced by these divisions and contributes to either the support of or opposition to social change. State legislators are on the front lines of these geographic ideological divides. These variations by region contribute to the increase in single-party control and have generated pronounced policy differences.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. McGrath ◽  
Josh M. Ryan

2000 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cindy Simon Rosenthal

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin H. Kirkland ◽  
Virginia Gray ◽  
David Lowery

In this research we hypothesize that aggregate PAC behavior is conditional in nature. PACs in a specific issue sector donate more to a certain political party's candidates the more that political party controls the legislature. However, the more active the legislature is on a specific set of issues the more people/groups/PACs are mobilized in response to the issue. Thus, a conditional relationship emerges where aggregate PAC donations to a political party are a function of party control, agenda activity, and an interaction of the two. We test this conditional theory using data from the Institute on Money in State Politics database on PAC donations to state legislative candidates divided into issue sectors. Our results provide support for our hypotheses that aggregate PAC donations to a political party's candidates are conditional on the level of agenda activity on the issues that concern the PACs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 418-440
Author(s):  
Todd Makse

Legislative committees rely on the expertise and experience of their members, but instability in committee systems threatens the enhancements in productivity associated with specialization. This can occur in two ways, both of which are more common in state legislative committees than they are in Congress. First, membership retention on committees is generally lower, even after accounting for differing levels of legislative turnover across legislatures. Second, many state legislative committee systems undergo reorganization between sessions, changing the policy jurisdictions, and, therefore, the applicability of members’ previously developed expertise. In this article, I examine the consequences of these two sources of committee instability on legislative output in 14 state legislatures. I find that both membership retention and jurisdictional reorganization significantly affect the number of bills processed through committees and the number of bills ultimately enacted. These linkages are also conditioned on several committee and institutional factors, particularly legislative turnover. Last, I find a weaker but discernible effect of membership retention on committees’ propensity to perform their gatekeeping role.


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