Free Agency and Personal Identity

2021 ◽  
pp. 118-140
PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph H. Turner

Author(s):  
Thomas Borstelmann

This book looks at an iconic decade when the cultural left and economic right came to the fore in American society and the world at large. While many have seen the 1970s as simply a period of failures epitomized by Watergate, inflation, the oil crisis, global unrest, and disillusionment with military efforts in Vietnam, this book creates a new framework for understanding the period and its legacy. It demonstrates how the 1970s increased social inclusiveness and, at the same time, encouraged commitments to the free market and wariness of government. As a result, American culture and much of the rest of the world became more—and less—equal. This book explores how the 1970s forged the contours of contemporary America. Military, political, and economic crises undercut citizens' confidence in government. Free market enthusiasm led to lower taxes, a volunteer army, individual 401(k) retirement plans, free agency in sports, deregulated airlines, and expansions in gambling and pornography. At the same time, the movement for civil rights grew, promoting changes for women, gays, immigrants, and the disabled. And developments were not limited to the United States. Many countries gave up colonial and racial hierarchies to develop a new formal commitment to human rights, while economic deregulation spread to other parts of the world, from Chile and the United Kingdom to China. Placing a tempestuous political culture within a global perspective, this book shows that the decade wrought irrevocable transformations upon American society and the broader world that continue to resonate today.


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson

This chapter examines the difference between John Locke's definition of a person [P], considered as a kind of thing, and his definition of a subject of experience of a certain sophisticated sort [S]. It first discusses the equation [P] = [S], where [S] is assumed to be a continuing thing that is able to survive radical change of substantial realization, as well as Locke's position about consciousness in relation to [P]'s identity or existence over time as [S]. It argues that Locke is not guilty of circularity because he is not proposing consciousness as the determinant of [S]'s identity over time, but only of [S]'s moral and legal responsibility over time. Finally, it suggests that the terms “Person” and “Personal identity” pull apart, in Locke's scheme of things, but in a perfectly coherent way.


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