scholarly journals Suicidality or the patient's right to refuse treatment?

2021 ◽  
Vol 143 (Supp 3) ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 37 (8) ◽  
pp. 974-975
Author(s):  
Thomas G. Gutheil

Author(s):  
Carl H. Coleman

Abstract One of the central tenets of contemporary bioethics is that mentally competent persons have a right to refuse medical treatment, even if the refusal might lead to the individual’s death. Despite this principle, laws in some jurisdictions authorize the nonconsensual treatment of persons with tuberculosis (TB) or other serious infectious diseases, on the grounds that doing so is necessary to protect the safety of others. This chapter argues that, in the vast majority of situations, overriding a refusal of treatment for infectious disease is not justifiable, as the risk to third parties can be avoided by the less restrictive alternative of isolating the patient. At the same time, it rejects the extreme position that the nonconsensual treatment of infectious disease is never appropriate. Instead, it concludes that compelling an individual to undergo treatment for infectious diseases may be ethically justifiable in exceptional situations if a refusal of treatment poses a grave risk to third parties, the treatment is not overly burdensome and has been established to be safe and effective, and less restrictive alternatives, including humanely isolating the patient, are not feasible under the circumstances. The burden should be on those seeking to compel unwanted treatment to demonstrate that these requirements have been met.


Author(s):  
Jessica W. Berg ◽  
Paul S. Appelbaum ◽  
Charles W. Lidz ◽  
Lisa S. Parker

From its inception, the law of informed consent has been based on two premises: first, that a patient has the right to receive sufficient information to make an informed choice about the treatment recommended; and second, that the patient may choose to accept or to decline the physician’s recommendation. The legitimacy of this second premise should be underscored because it is too often belied by the everyday language of medical practice. Getting a consent is medical jargon that implies that patient agreement is the only acceptable outcome. Indeed, the term informed consent itself suggests that patients are expected to agree to be treated rather than to decline treatment. Unless patients are viewed as having the right to say no, as well as yes, and even yes with conditions, much of the rationale for informed consent evaporates. Nonetheless, the medical profession’s reaction to patients who refuse treatment often has been less than optimal. The right to refuse treatment is frequently ignored in practice because it is inconsistent with the history and ethos of medicine (1,2). Physicians are trained to treat illness and to prolong life; situations in which they cannot do either—not because of limitations of knowledge or technology, but because patients or third parties reject their recommendations for care—evoke profound feelings of frustration and even anger. It would not be too much to suggest that these confrontations challenge an essential element of the medical identity. Physicians’ reactions to these situations are varied. Some will contend with patients over their refusal, while others, having assimilated a distorted version of patients’ right to refuse treatment, may too quickly abandon their patients to the consequences of their choices, thereby depriving them of the guidance for which patients traditionally have turned to their physicians. Regardless of the quality of care offered to patients or the degree of concern of those who treat them, some patients will have reasons of their own to decline treatment. Before considering how clinicians might respond to these situations, this chapter reviews the status of the law regarding treatment refusal, surveying a legal landscape that has seen dramatic changes in the last decade.


Author(s):  
Rebecca Lewis

Chapter 9 describes cases related to one of the most important autonomy issues involved in the involuntary hospitalization of individuals with mental illness—the right to refuse treatment. These cases highlight the different judicial opinions about how to manage patients who refuse treatment as exemplified by the contrast between a treatment-driven approach in Rennie v. Klein, to a rights-driven approach in Rogers v. Commissioner. Other cases included in this chapter are Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Joseph Saikowitz, and In the Matter of the Guardianship of Richard Roe, III.


1989 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 213-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Rachlin

BMJ ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 324 (7345) ◽  
pp. 1055b-1055
Author(s):  
Z. Kmietowicz

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