A decay of rights: The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council

<p>The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council is the most recent legal development in the New Zealand debate about fluoridation of public water supplies. That decision centred on the interpretation of section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right to refuse medical treatment. The Court held that the fluoridation in question was legal, and reached a limited definition of medical treatment that did not encompass fluoridation. This paper analyses the reasoning leading to that interpretation, concluding that the decision is problematic and that the definition of s 11 needs to be remedied. The use of the wording of s 11 to limit the definition of medical treatment was inappropriate, as was the policy reasoning used to support that limitation. The structure of reasoning followed exacerbated these issues and adhered too closely to the reasoning in United States cases. Furthermore, the application of a de minimis threshold was conducted without adequate scrutiny, and such a threshold should not be applied to s 11.</p>

A decay of rights: The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council

<p>The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council is the most recent legal development in the New Zealand debate about fluoridation of public water supplies. That decision centred on the interpretation of section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right to refuse medical treatment. The Court held that the fluoridation in question was legal, and reached a limited definition of medical treatment that did not encompass fluoridation. This paper analyses the reasoning leading to that interpretation, concluding that the decision is problematic and that the definition of s 11 needs to be remedied. The use of the wording of s 11 to limit the definition of medical treatment was inappropriate, as was the policy reasoning used to support that limitation. The structure of reasoning followed exacerbated these issues and adhered too closely to the reasoning in United States cases. Furthermore, the application of a de minimis threshold was conducted without adequate scrutiny, and such a threshold should not be applied to s 11.</p>

Relational Autonomy, the Right to Reject Treatment, and Advance Directives in Japan

Although the patient’s right to decide what they want for themselves, which is encompassed in the notion of ‘patient-centred medicine’ and ‘informed consent’, is widely recognised and emphasised in Japan, there remain grave problems when it comes to respecting the wishes of the no-longer-competent when death is imminent. In general, it is believed that the concepts above do not include the right to refuse treatment when treatment withdrawal inevitably results in death, even when the patient previously expressed the wish to exercise this right when competent. In this paper, I first explain the current social and legal situation in Japan, where the lack of legal clarity regarding the right to reject treatment tends to result in doctors adopting the interpretation of patients’ words that is least conducive to treatment withdrawal. I then argue that the right to refuse treatment should be taken seriously, even when the patient is no longer competent, or the treatment refusal will result in death. I suggest that the concept of relational autonomy might have some practical and valuable implications in a country where individual autonomy is considered incompatible with societal values. Finally, I answer possible objections to relational autonomy and address the widespread societal concern about sliding down the slippery slope from allowing the right to refuse treatment to the obligation to die.

Ethical Issues

Voluntary stopping eating and drinking (VSED) has strong similarities to refusing treatment, with a person’s right to use VSED nearly as firm as the widely accepted right to refuse lifesaving treatment. VSED is less similar to medical assistance in dying (MAID), and the moral justification of allowing MAID is more problematic than the justification of VSED, in part because of the more direct involvement of clinicians. MAID and VSED share some of the same challenges, however, including criticism that they both involve suicide and assisting suicide. VSED survives those challenges well without depending on specific statutory exemption for caregivers from constituting assistance in a suicide as MAID does. Whether to inform potentially interested but unaware patients of VSED as a permissible option requires sensitivity to variations among individual patients and often difficult discretionary judgment.

PROSECUTOR'S REFUSAL TO CHARGE

В статье рассматривается вопрос о возможности отказа от обвинения на стадии предварительного слушания. Указано, чем отказ от обвинения отличается от изменения обвинения. Авторы анализируют возможные варианты отказа прокурора от обвинения, дают классификацию видов и оснований такого отказа. Решается вопрос о том, в какой форме возможен отказ прокурора от обвинения, обосновывается необходимость согласования позиции государственного обвинителя с прокурором, утвердившим обвинительное заключение и поручившим поддержание обвинения. Дается оценка соблюдению прав потерпевшего при реализации государственным обвинителем права на отказ от обвинения. Приведена возможная структура речи государственного обвинителя в судебных прениях при отказе от обвинения. Предлагается внести в уголовно-процессуальное законодательство Российской Федерации некоторые изменения. The article discusses the possibility of abandoning the charge at the preliminary hearing stage. It is indicated how the refusal of the charge differs from the change of the charge. The authors analyze the possible options for the prosecutor's refusal to charge, give a classification of the types and grounds for such refusal. The question of the form in which the prosecutor's refusal from the prosecution is possible is resolved, and the need to coordinate the position of the public prosecutor with the prosecutor who approved the indictment and entrusted the prosecution with maintaining the prosecution is justified. An assessment is made of the observance of the rights of the victim in the exercise by the public prosecutor of the right to refuse to charge. The possible structure of the speech of the public prosecutor in the judicial debate when rejecting the charge is given. It is proposed to make some changes to the criminal procedure legislation of the Russian Federation.

Conscientious Objection: A Review of State Pharmacy Laws and Regulations

Most states have adopted conscience clauses since the Roe v. Wade paradigm in the 1970s; however, not all clauses are respective to pharmacists. The purpose of this report is to quantify the presence of conscientious objection among US states with respect to pharmacist’s right to refuse to dispense. Fifty Boards of Pharmacy administrative codes were consulted for review. If Web sites were ambiguous or undeterminable, E-mail requests were sent on active legislation per National Association of Boards of Pharmacy contact information. Eleven states have conscience clauses present in their pharmacy administrative code—nearly double than last published in 2006. Requirements vary throughout the states including drug-specific limitations, requirement in writing, or notification in advance. Some states alternatively require duty to dispense. Less than one-fourth of United States boards of pharmacy provide a conscience clause or similar intended language in laws or policies. Within those states, pharmacists have a right to refuse to perform certain services based on religious, ethical, or moral objections. Imprecise language throughout the nation allows the rights to vary widely.

Noilguma regulējums Latvijas civiltiesībās

Extinctive prescription is a universally recognized mechanism to terminate obligations. However, every legal system must determine whether the extinctive prescription functions automatically (ipso iure) or does it grant a debtor a right to refuse the performance of prescribed obligations. The author argues that in Latvia the extinctive prescription must be functioning as an objection that the debtor may make to refuse the performance of an obligation. This necessarily implies that a court cannot raise the extinctive prescription unless it is invoked by the debtor.