Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics

Author(s):  
Henry Veatch
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
George Pattison

The devout self comes to devotion as one who has already fallen short of the Christian ideal and now wants to do better, but it is made clear that perfection will not be achieved in this life and the soul will fall many times. The devout life is thus from the beginning a life of repentance or, more radically, mortification. The self is pictured as engaged in a holy war with itself in which, in the end, it must accept defeat by God. In this defeat it learns humility, widely acclaimed as the most important Christian virtue. However, humility means something different from the modest self-regard of Aristotelian ethics and, as de Sales makes clear, means welcoming abjection. The great model for humility is Christ himself, both as regards the circumstances of his life and death and in the humility of incarnation itself.


1964 ◽  
Vol 57 (7) ◽  
pp. 322
Author(s):  
John P. Anton ◽  
Henry B. Veatch
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
M. Ashraf Adeel

This article looks at some of the salient analyses of the concept of wasaṭīyah (moderation) in the ancient Greek and the Islamic traditions and uses them to develop a contemporary view of the matter. Greek ethics played a huge role in shaping the ethical views of Muslim philosophers and theologians, and thus the article starts with an overview of the revival of contemporary western virtue ethics, in many ways an extension of Platonic-Aristotelian ethics, and then looks briefly at the place of moderation or temperance in Platonic-Aristotelian ethics. This sets the stage for an exposition of the position taken by Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ghazali, which is then used as a backdrop for suggesting a revival of the Qur’an’s virtue ethics. After outlining a basis for its virtue ethics, the Qur’anic view of the virtue of wasaṭīyah is discussed briefly and its position on this virtue’s nature in terms of the individual and the community is presented.


Author(s):  
Katerina Deligiorgi

Hegel’s criticism of morality, or Moralität, has had a decisive influence in the reception of his thought. By general acknowledgment, while his writings support a broadly neo-Aristotelian ethics of self-actualization, his views on moral philosophy are exhausted by his criticisms of Kant, whom he treats as paradigmatic exponent of the standpoint of morality. The aim of this chapter is to correct this received view and show that Hegel offers a positive conception of moral willing. The main argument is presented in two parts: (a) an interpretation of the ‘Morality’ section of the Philosophy of Right that shows Hegel defending a guise of the good version of willing; and (b) an examination of problems raised by this view of willing, some of which are anticipated by Hegel in in his treatment of the ‘Idea of the Good’ in the Logic, and of the interpretative options available to deal with these problems.


Author(s):  
John Monfasani

Unlike most Renaissance humanists, Valla took a special interest in philosophy. However, his most influential writing was a work of grammar, Elegantiae Linguae Latinae (The Fine Points of the Latin Language); he had no comprehensive philosophy, nor did he write mainly on philosophy. Valla considered himself to be a revolutionary overturning received opinions, bragging that through his works he was ‘overturning all the wisdom of the ancients’. His preference for Quintilian over Cicero and criticism of classical authors shocked older humanists, and religious authorities were upset by his views on the Trinity and on papal authority, but Valla never sought the overthrow of classical studies – or the papacy for that matter. He sought rather to destroy the Aristotelianism then reigning in the universities. In De Vero Falsoque Bono (On the True and False Good) (1431), he argued for the superiority of Epicureanism over Stoic and Aristotelian ethics. In De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Will) (1439), he corrected Boethius’ treatment of free will and predestination. In the Dialectica (1438–9) he set out to reform logic and philosophy because he believed Aristotle had corrupted them. Asserting that Aristotle had falsified thought because he had falsified language, Valla was determined to show how logic rightly conformed to the linguistic usage of the classical literary authors; essentially Valla had aggressively revived the ancient competition between the rhetorical and philosophical traditions. The first great humanist, Francesco Petrarca (better known in English as Petrarch), had attempted something similar in the fourteenth century, but Valla’s knowledge of philosophy was greater than Petrarch’s and he had access to more sources. Furthermore, Valla knew Greek and could read texts which the medieval Aristotelians knew only in Latin translation.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document