Contemporary Epistemology And The Rationality of Christian Belief: Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, and Nancey Murphy

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. BYSTROM
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal

O artigo pretende avaliar criticamente o conceito de fé e o modo como a fé cristã é racionalmente justificada por Alvin Plantinga em sua principal obra Warranted Christian Belief (2000). Para tanto, o texto parte de uma comparação com a proposta de Richard Swinburne. Após discutir brevemente a epistemologia geral de Plantinga, o texto expõe a sua aplicação à crença em Deus e à fé cristã. A tese de Plantinga de que a fé não constitui um “salto no escuro” e que o seu componente não-teórico é semelhante ao amor erótico é comparada com a visão de Swinburne, segundo a qual a fé firme pode comportar elementos de incerteza na crença e supõe uma decisão voluntária, sendo, por isso mesmo, meritória. A comparação sugerirá que as diferenças indicam uma possibilidade de complementaridade entre as duas concepções.


2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE

Alvin PlantingaWarranted Christian Belief(New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).In the two previous volumes of his trilogy on ‘warrant’, Alvin Plantinga developed his general theory of warrant, defined as that characteristic enough of which terms a true belief into knowledge. A belief B has warrant if and only if: (1) it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, (2) in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which the faculties were designed, (3) according to a design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs, when (4) there is a high statistical probability of such beliefs being true.Thus my belief that there is a table in front of me has warrant if in the first place, in producing it, my cognitive faculties were functioning properly, the way they were meant to function. Plantinga holds that just as our heart or liver may function properly or not, so may our cognitive faculties. And he also holds that if God made us, our faculties function properly if they function in the way God designed them to function; whereas if evolution (uncaused by God) made us, then our faculties function properly if they function in the way that (in some sense) evolution designed them to function.


1989 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 167-191
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump

Recent work on the subject of faith has tended to focus on the epistemology of religious belief, considering such issues as whether beliefs held in faith are rational and how they may be justified. Richard Swinburne, for example, has developed an intricate explanation of the relationship between the propositions of faith and the evidence for them. Alvin Plantinga, on the other hand, has maintained that belief in God may be properly basic, that is, that a belief that God exists can be part of the foundation of a rational noetic structure. This sort of work has been useful in drawing attention to significant issues in the epistemology of religion, but these approaches to faith seem to me also to deepen some long-standing perplexities about traditional Christian views of faith.


2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal

o artigo pretende mostrar que a crítica que Alvin Plantinga faz contra o bayesianismo como descrição do que está envolvido na noção de racionalidade não se aplica a toda forma de bayesianismo. A abordagem de Swinburne, baseada em uma teoria lógica da probabilidade, é um exemplo de bayesianismo não atingido pela crítica de Plantinga. Além disso, o artigo defende que, em uma abordagem bayesiana, desaparece o problema da probabilidade decrescente, apontado por Plantinga em Warranted Christian Belief (2000). Assim, mesmo que não seja uma descrição suficiente da noção de racionalidade, o bayesianismo ajuda a entender importantes elementos presentes no raciocínio indutivo, especialmente os relativos aos argumentos cumulativos.


Philo ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-118
Author(s):  
Tyler Wunder ◽  

2008 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-195
Author(s):  
Herman Philipse

In this article it is argued that all religious beliefs to the effect that a specific god exists are prima facie implausible for two reasons: traditional sources of religious knowledge, or methods of religious investigation, such as revelations, prayer, and the interpretation of ‘signs’, have turned out to be unreliable, and religious beliefs are implausible given the background knowledge provided by modern science and scholarship. Four contemporary apologetic strategies for the religious believer, developed in detail by analytic philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga or Richard Swinburne, are discussed and criticized. It is further argued that the 18 objections against my argument for universal strong disjunctive atheism in ‘Atheïstisch manifest. De onredelijkheid van religie’ (Amsterdam, 1995, 2004), put forward by René van Woudenberg and Rik Peels (NTT 62/1:24-44), are inconclusive.


Theology ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 119 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-62
Author(s):  
Keith Ward

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