scholarly journals Research on Evaluation of Collaborative Innovation Ability of Collaborative Innovation Network of Universities Based on Fuzzy Matter Element

Author(s):  
Lixiong Wu ◽  
Yongzhou Li
Information ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wu ◽  
Shao ◽  
Feng

The evolution of a collaborative innovation network depends on the interrelationships among the innovation subjects. Every single small change affects the network topology, which leads to different evolution results. A logical relationship exists between network evolution and innovative behaviors. An accurate understanding of the characteristics of the network structure can help the innovative subjects to adopt appropriate innovative behaviors. This paper summarizes the three characteristics of collaborative innovation networks, knowledge transfer, policy environment, and periodic cooperation, and it establishes a dynamic evolution model for a resource-priority connection mechanism based on innovation resource theory. The network subjects are not randomly testing all of the potential partners, but have a strong tendency to, which is, innovation resource. The evolution process of a collaborative innovation network is simulated with three different government behaviors as experimental objects. The evolution results show that the government should adopt the policy of supporting the enterprises that recently entered the network, which can maintain the innovation vitality of the network and benefit the innovation output. The results of this study also provide a reference for decision-making by the government and enterprises.


2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 407-411
Author(s):  
Wei Tian ◽  
Li Zhou

In this paper, we have constructed supply chain consigning collaborative innovation modes and explored the innovation game process involving supplier, manufacturer and third-party research firm where the manufacturer acting as a core firm. We consider innovation cost coefficient information symmetry and asymmetry. The research shows that supplier’s innovation effect is more direct to supply chain. When innovation ability is similar, no matter judging from innovation inputs, expect profits or demand quantities, the mode of the supplier consigning innovation is superior to that with third-party and non-collaborative innovation.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Fan Yang ◽  
Long Yang ◽  
Ping Li

In the era of the knowledge economy, it is urgent for organizations to solve the problem of knowledge hiding of internal members to accelerate the speed and efficiency of knowledge dissemination and innovation and adapt to rapid changes in the market. At present, research on knowledge hiding has received extensive attention from Western countries, but there are few relevant studies in China. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of second-level knowledge hiding of organizational members and analyzes the main factors affecting the stable equilibrium point using MATLAB numerical simulation. The results show that knowledge leakage risk is positively correlated with knowledge hiding. The ability of knowledge absorption and transformation is positively correlated with the behavior of knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between collaborative innovation ability and knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between knowledge stock and knowledge hiding. Only when the incentive reaches a certain level can organizational members be encouraged to give up knowledge hiding. This paper provides a more comprehensive and dynamic picture of the evolutionary game of knowledge hiding among members in the organization and provides a new idea of knowledge management for organizational managers.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Gendreau ◽  
Joshua D. Summers ◽  
Lamiae Benhayoun-Sadafiyine ◽  
Marie-Anne Le Dain

Abstract Initial usability testing was used to identify and fix usability concerns within a recently developed absorptive capacity assessment tool. The tool was designed to aid innovation management decision making by helping firms understand their processing of external knowledge within the context of a collaborative innovation network. Part of the recent development of the tool involved the implementation of Simos-Roy-Figueira’s revised method for eliciting subjective importance weights. However, the method, as it was applied within the tool, suffered from poor usability that could not be fully addressed. This paper presents a study on the usability of the tool further by conducting additional think-aloud studies to better understand its nature. Five common attributes of usability (efficiency, effectiveness, satisfaction, learnability, and usefulness) were characterized based on the findings from the think-aloud studies in order to develop a list of recommendations for improving usability. The goal of these recommendations is to help future academic developers of decision aid tools to better consider usability in their own work to maximize the impact and dissemination of their research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Liangqun Qi ◽  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Xinyu Zang

Collaborative innovation networks have the basic attributes of complex networks. The interaction of innovation network members has promoted the development of collaborative innovation networks. Using the game-based theory in the B-A scale-free network context, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of network members and explores the emergence mechanism from collaborative innovation behavior to the macroevolution of networks. The results show that revenue distribution, compensation of the betrayer, government subsidies, and supervision have positively contributed to the continued stability of collaborative innovation networks. However, the effect mechanisms are dissimilar for networks of different scales. In small networks, the rationality of the revenue distribution among members that have similar strengths should receive more attention, and the government should implement medium-intensity supervision measures. In large networks, however, compensation of the betrayer should be attached greater importance to, and financial support from the government can promote stable evolution more effectively.


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