Reading the Nicomachean Ethics as an Investigation

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-196
Author(s):  
Guy Schuh
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Small Point

Abstract Aristotle tells us that the Nicomachean Ethics is an “inquiry” and an “investigation” (methodos and zētēsis). This paper focuses on an under-appreciated way that the work is investigative: its employment of an exploratory investigative strategy—that is, its frequent positing of, and later revision or even rejection of, merely preliminary positions. Though this may seem like a small point, this aspect of the work’s methodology has important consequences for how we should read it—specifically, we should be open to the possibility that some contradictions in the text are the result of his employment of this investigative strategy. In the paper, I describe this investigative strategy, discuss what motivates Aristotle to employ it in the work, and go through three contradictions that are plausibly identified as examples of its use—specifically, his claims that courageous people do and do not fear death, that friendship is and is not mutually recognized goodwill, and that virtuous people do and do not choose noble actions for their own sake.

‘Ought’ in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Annas
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics

Much attention has been paid to the issue of whether, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses what we would recognize as deontic concepts. On the basis of a study of dei and other constructions I argue that Aristotle’s use of them is often misconstrued and should be interpreted as giving reasons that are reasons of virtue, not a distinct alternative. Many issues remain live in the interpretation (and the translation) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics; in this essay I offer a contribution to one of these, the nature and role of deontic concepts in the work. I offer this essay with pleasure to a celebration of Terry and Gail’s work.

Practical Truth

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Charles
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Third Way ◽  
The Third ◽  
Two Component ◽  
Major Competitor ◽  
Additional Support

This paper concerns Aristotle’s discussion of practical truth in Nicomachean Ethics VI.2.1139a17–b5. The essay falls into five sections. In the first three, I outline two styles of interpretation of Aristotle’s remarks and suggest that one of them (which I call ‘the third way’) gives a better reading than that offered by its major competitor (which I call ‘the two-component’ view). In the fourth I consider some texts in the remainder of NE VI which provide additional support for the third way of reading. In a brief concluding section, I seek to locate Aristotle’s view of practical truth, so understood, in a broader philosophical context.

Aristotle on How Pleasure Perfects Activity (Nicomachean Ethics x.5 1175a29-b14): The Optimising-View

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Machek
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Do So

AbstractThis article offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s ambiguous and much-discussed claim that pleasure perfects activity (NE x.4). This interpretation provides an alternative to the two main competing readings of this claim in the scholarship: the addition-view, which envisages the perfection conferred by pleasure as an extra perfection beyond the perfection of activity itself; and the identity-view, according to which pleasure just is the perfect activity itself. The proposed interpretation departs from both these views in rejecting their assumption that pleasure cannot perfect the activity itself, and argues that pleasure makes activity perfect by optimising the exercise of one’s capacities for that activity. Those who build or play music with pleasure do so better than those who do not delight in these activities. The basis of this interpretation is Aristotle’s little-read remarks from the following chapter, i. e. NE x.5, about how pleasure “increases” the activity.

Die Ursprünge des spätantiken philosophischen Curriculums im kaiserzeitlichen Aristotelismus

Elenchos ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
Matthias Perkams
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Early Date ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Rule Out

Abstract The paper presents the first known evidence of the so called “late ancient philosophical curriculum” ethics, physics, theology, by demonstrating that this division of philosophy can be found already in the introduction of Aspasios’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. It is argued that this text can be dated roundabout 70 years earlier than the earliest reliable testimony hitherto known in Clemens Alexandrinus. Furthermore, the paper presents some neglected evidence for this curriculum from different works of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Based upon those texts and a new analysis of some already well-known passages, it proposes to regard the scheme ethics, physics, theology as an originally Aristotelian model, which has been later taken over by Platonists. This does not rule out the possibility that Platonic ideas have been influenced the scheme at a very early date.

scholarly journals Aristotle on Attention

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Musical Piece ◽  
Loud Sound ◽  
Geometrical Problem ◽  
Physiological Processes ◽  
Perceptual Attention ◽  
Specific Selectivity ◽  
Cognitive Activities ◽  
The Common

Abstract I argue that a study of the Nicomachean Ethics and of the Parva Naturalia shows that Aristotle had a notion of attention. This notion captures the common aspects of apparently different phenomena like perceiving something vividly, being distracted by a loud sound or by a musical piece, focusing on a geometrical problem. For Aristotle, these phenomena involve a specific selectivity that is the outcome of the competition between different cognitive stimuli. This selectivity is attention. I argue that Aristotle studied the common aspects of the physiological processes at the basis of attention and its connection with pleasure. His notion can explain perceptual attention and intellectual attention as voluntary or involuntary phenomena. In addition, it sheds light on how attention and enjoyment can enhance our cognitive activities.

NOTES ON NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1173a2–5

2016 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 484-490
Author(s):  
Gösta Grönroos
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Good For ◽  
Strong Claim

In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic.) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus' argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172b9–11). At 1172b35–1173a5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus' argument. For some object (οἱ δ’ἐνιστάμενοι) to the argument by questioning one of its premisses, namely that what all creatures aim at is the good (1172b12–15). Instead, they claim that what all creatures aim at is not good (ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, 1172b36). This claim is reasonably taken to mean that not everything that all creatures aim at is good. But, as we shall shortly see, Aristotle dismisses it in a way suggesting a less charitable interpretation. At any rate, the significance of this objection is that it challenges the strong claim that what all creatures aim at is the good with an argument against the weaker claim that what all creatures aim at is good (or a good). For if the weaker claim is refuted, then the strong claim is refuted as well. Aristotle takes issue with the argument against the weaker claim, but without committing himself to the strong claim.

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