scholarly journals The Perceptual-cognitive Foundation of the Subject-predicate Structure

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaoru Takamatsu
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Model Structure ◽  
System A ◽  
Logical Connectives ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Grammatical Structures ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

This article describes a theoretical attempt to found thesubject predicate structure of declarative sentences on a frameworkof the human perceptual cognitive system. The basis of this studyis the idea that perception and cognition of events in the worldwould form mental representations in the system , a kind of modelsof the events that embody pieces of information about the events.This idea suggests that such models have structures that correspondto grammatical structures of the linguistic expressions thatrepresent the events and express the pieces of informationembodied by the models. The model structure s that correspond tothe subject predicate structure and logical connectives have beenconstructed following the way in which the system should functionto form the models of the events. This construction of thestructures entails propositional logic. Application of the structurest o the liar paradox le ads t o a new solution of this paradox .Keywords:

Dialetheism and the Problem of the Missing Difference

SATS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
Gregory Scott Moss
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Classical Model ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Liar ◽  
Philosophical Community ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Self Reference ◽  
Graham Priest

Abstract During the past few decades, Graham Priest has advocated for Dialetheism, the controversial position that some contradictions are true. Dialetheism entails that the Law of Non-Contradiction fails. In recent decades the philosophical community has begun to recognize the significant challenge posed by Priest’s arguments. Priest has primarily appealed to paradoxes of self-reference, such as the Liar Paradox, to support his position. Following Priest’s approach, I offer another argument for Dialetheism, which appeals to a self-referential paradox that has been more or less ignored in the philosophical literature on the subject: the paradox of the missing difference. When we reflect on the question ‘what is a concept?’ from the perspective of a classical model of conceptual analysis, we arrive at the paradox of the missing difference. Although contradictions may be improbable, when we reflect on the question ‘how is the domain of concepts possible?’ we are led to a startling principle: without dialetheia any theory concerning concept formation (from a classical perspective on concepts) would be impossible. Dialetheism is a necessary condition for the existence of a domain of concepts in general. As a result, Dialetheism may even be more central to philosophical reflection than even dialetheists themselves have recognized.

Pluralism and the Liar

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory Wright ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Treatment ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

Pluralists maintain that there is more than one truth property in virtue of which bearers are true. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how they diagnose the liar paradox or what resources they have available to treat it. This chapter considers one recent attempt by Cotnoir (2013b) to treat the Liar. It argues that pluralists should reject the version of pluralism that Cotnoir assumes, discourse pluralism, in favor of a more naturalized approach to truth predication in real languages, which should be a desideratum on any successful pluralist conception. Appealing to determination pluralism instead, which focuses on truth properties, it then proposes an alternative treatment to the Liar that shows liar sentences to be undecidable.

Microlanguages, Vagueness, and Paradox

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Dynamic Theory ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Static Picture ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

This chapter follows recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, which rejects the standard, static picture of languages and highlights its context sensitivity—a dynamic theory of the nature of language. On the view advocated, human languages are things that we build on a conversation-by-conversation basis. The author calls such languages microlanguages. The chapter argues that thinking of languages in terms of microlanguages yields interesting consequences for how we should think about the liar paradox. In particular, we will see that microlanguages have admissible conditions that preclude liar-like sentences. On the view presented in the chapter, liar sentences are not even sentences of any microlanguage that we might construct (or assertorically utter). Accordingly, the proper approach to such a paradoxical sentence is to withhold the sentence—not permitting it to be admitted into our microlanguage unless, or until, certain sharpening occurs.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley Armour-Garb ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

In this chapter, after introducing a few versions of the liar paradox and identifying the pathology that the versions of the paradox appear to present, the author considers some proposals for how to understand ‘paradox’ and goes on to offer a particular reading of that notion. He then identifies a number of projects the completion of which would contribute to our understanding—or, in some cases, our resolution—of the liar paradox and, after considering certain “treatments” of the paradox, highlights certain “revenge” problems that arise for such treatments. In the concluding section, the author summarizes each of the chapters that are contained in the volume.

scholarly journals The Liar Without Relativism

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poppy Mankowitz
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Full Understanding ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Semantic Relativism

AbstractSome in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and semantic relativism: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (Erkenntnis 82(4):913–928, 2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Łukowski (Synthese 1–20, 2019) propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural language shows that neither of the purported connections can be maintained. There is no reason why a solution to the Liar paradox needs to accept relativism.

A NOTE ON THE LIAR-PARADOX

Mind ◽  
1955 ◽  
Vol LXIV (256) ◽  
pp. 543-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. USHENKO
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox
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