scholarly journals Folk intuitions about reference change and the causal theory of reference

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Wiegmann ◽  
Steffen Koch
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Historical View ◽  
Gareth Evans ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Folk Intuitions

In this paper, we present and discuss the findings of two experiments about reference change. Cases of reference change have sometimes been invoked to challenge traditional versions of semantic externalism, but the relevant cases have never been tested empirically. The experiments we have conducted use variants of the famous Twin Earth scenario to test folk intuitions about whether natural kind terms such as ‘water’ or ‘salt’ switch reference after being constantly (mis)applied to different kinds. Our results indicate that this is indeed so. We argue that this finding is evidence against Saul Kripke’s causal-historical view of reference, and at least provisional evidence in favor of the causal source view of reference as suggested by Gareth Evans and Michael Devitt.

scholarly journals Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jussi Haukioja ◽  
mons nyquist ◽  
Jussi Jylkkä
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Deep Structure ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Standard Samples ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Degree Of Similarity

Following the influential thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and others, philosophers of language have for the most part adopted semantic externalism concerning natural kind terms. In this paper, we present results from three experiments on the reference of natural kind terms. Our results confirm some standard externalist assumptions, but are in conflict with others: ordinary speakers take both appearance and underlying nature to be central in their categorization judgments. Moreover, our results indicate that speakers’ categorization judgments are gradual, and proportional to the degree of similarity between new samples and familiar, “standard” samples. These findings pose problems for traditional theories, both externalist and internalist.

scholarly journals Essentially Contested Concepts and Semantic Externalism

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon J. Evnine
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Temporal Part ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Essentially Contested Concepts ◽  
Historical Tradition ◽  
Essentially Contested Concept

Abstract In 1956, W.B. Gallie introduced his idea of essentially contested concepts. In my paper, I offer a novel interpretation of his theory and argue that his theory, thus interpreted, is correct. The key to my interpretation lies in a condition Gallie places on essentially contested concepts that other interpreters downplay or dismiss: that the use of an essentially contested concept must be derived “from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept.” This reveals a similarity between Gallie’s views and the semantic externalist views of Hilary Putnam, and others, about natural kind terms like “water” and “tiger.” I argue that natural kind terms and terms for essentially contested concepts are two species of a single semantic genus. In the case of natural kind terms, a term refers to a natural kind, the exemplars are instances of that kind, and the relation between the exemplars and anything to which the term applies is co-membership of the kind. In the case of terms for essentially contested concepts, a term refers to an historical tradition, the exemplar is a stage or temporal part of that tradition, and the relation between the exemplar and anything to which the term refers is being the heir of. This allows me to understand the contests that alerted Gallie to the phenomenon of essentially contested concepts as contests over the ownership of historical traditions.

Putnam on the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 819-828 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Linsky
Keyword(s):  
Science Fiction ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
The Third ◽  
Traditional Notion ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Twin Earth

In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Hilary Putnam presents several arguments to show that natural kind terms do not have a meaning or “sense” of a Fregean sort. Instead, he says, they function much like indexicals such as “this” or “I”, whose reference is determined by the circumstances of their use, not by unique properties of the referent that might be “expressed” in a sense. Putnam further argues that this account covers most general terms in our language, not just kind terms like “water” and “tiger”. He thus presents a serious challenge for the traditional notion of meaning, for if he is right only a few score words would be left with a meaning.In this paper I wish to distinguish three arguments which appear intermingled in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. Two of the arguments make explicit use of the same science-fiction example of a “Twin Earth” while the third uses a related example, and all three might be seen as showing that kind terms are like “rigid designators”. My purpose is to sort out these three arguments and show their importance for the theory of meaning.

scholarly journals Intuitions, Externalism, and Conceptual Analysis

2010 ◽  
pp. 81-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jussi Haukioja
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Standard Methodology ◽  
The Way

Semantic externalism about a class of expressions is often thought to make conceptual analysis about members of that class impossible. In particular, since externalism about natural kind terms makes the essences of natural kinds empirically discoverable, it seems that mere reflection on one's natural kind concept will not be able to tell one anything substantial about what it is for something to fall under one's natural kind concepts. Many hold the further view that one cannot even know anything substantial about the reference-fixers of one's natural kind concepts by armchair reflection. In this paper I want to question this latter view and claim that, because of the way our standard methodology of doing theories of reference relies on semantic intuitions, typical externalists in fact presuppose that one can know the reference-fixers of one's natural kind concepts by mere armchair reflection. The more interesting question is how substantial such knowledge can be. I also take some steps toward answering this question.

scholarly journals Kuhn, Putnam and the Reference

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-24
Author(s):  
Luis Fernandez Moreno ◽  
Paula Atencia Conde-Pumpido
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Reference Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
Classic Paper

In some of his writings, Kuhn criticized Putnam’s causal theory of reference for natural kind terms put forward in his classic paper “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” claiming that Putnam’s theory cannot explain the reference changes of natural kind terms. After looking into Kuhn’s objections to Putnam’s reference theory, some of the main features of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and some traits of Putnam’s later version of his theory, we will argue, on the one hand, that Putnam’s later reference theory contains some components that enhance the explanation of the reference change of natural kind terms, and on the other hand, that Kuhn’s and Putnam’s views on reference do no differ that much, especially in virtue ofcertain similarities between Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and Putnam’s thesis of conceptual relativity.

The Logic of Natural Kind Terms

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-216
Author(s):  
Lifeng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms

scholarly journals The Psychology of Natural Kind Terms

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Foster-Hanson ◽  
Marjorie Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms

Draft of chapter to appear in: The Psychology of Natural Kinds Terms. In S.T. Biggs, & H. Geirsson (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook on Linguistic Reference. London: Routledge.

What Are Natural Kinds?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Soames
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
General Term ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
World State ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Ontological Question

This chapter approaches the ontological question, “What are natural kinds?” through another, partially linguistic, question. “What must natural kinds be like if the conventional wisdom about natural kind terms is correct?” Although answering this question will not tell us everything we want to know, it will, be useful in narrowing the range of feasible ontological alternatives. The chapter summarizes the contemporary linguistic wisdom and then tests different proposals about kinds against it. It takes simple natural kind terms—like “green,” “gold,” “water,” “tiger,” and “light”—to be Millian terms that rigidly designate properties typically determined by a reference-fixing stipulation to the effect that the general term is to designate whatever property provides the explanation of why, at actual world-state, all, or nearly all, the samples of items associated with the term by speakers who introduce it have the observational properties they do.

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