The weight of truth: Lessons for minimalists from Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument.
Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference, and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, the minimalist regards them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents; and, when applied to minimalism, they show us why we should abandon it.Published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114.3: 261–89.
1911 ◽
Vol 11
(1)
◽
pp. 228-230
Keyword(s):
1917 ◽
Vol 28
(1)
◽
pp. 129-131
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
1915 ◽
Vol 15
(1)
◽
pp. 428-430
1937 ◽
Vol 37
(1)
◽
pp. 231-233
Keyword(s):