CHAPTER 4. Tax Coordination

2005 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Tax Coordination

INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX COORDINATION: RECORD AND PROSPECT

1952 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-260
Author(s):  
L. L. ECKER-RACZ
Keyword(s):  
Tax Coordination

Economic Integration and Tax Coordination in Regional Economic Communities

2019 ◽  
pp. 103-120
Author(s):  
Sijbren Cnossen
Keyword(s):  
Economic Integration ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Regional Economic ◽  
Tax Coordination ◽  
Excise Tax ◽  
Tax Neutrality ◽  
Free Competition ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Standards Of Living ◽  
Border Controls

Chapter 8 reviews the various stages of economic integration that can be distinguished and discusses VAT (and excise tax) coordination in the presence and absence of border controls. All African countries belong to a regional economic community (REC), and often to more than one. The countries are closely monitoring the remarkable combination of free politics and free economics achieved by the common market (now the single market) of the member states of the EU. Free trade and free competition raise the standards of living in participating member countries. In this setting, tax coordination should ensure that equal conditions for competitors are not distorted by discriminatory tax systems—a criterion that is referred to as tax neutrality. At the same time, however, the participating countries should retain as much tax autonomy as possible in order to be able to pursue their own social and economic policy goals.

scholarly journals Self-enforcing capital tax coordination

2018 ◽  
Vol 88 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 915-940 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Eichner ◽  
Rüdiger Pethig
Keyword(s):  
Tax Coordination ◽  
Capital Tax

scholarly journals Tax competition, tax coordination and tax harmonization: The effects of EMU

Empirica ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernd Genser ◽  
Andreas Haufler
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Tax Coordination ◽  
Tax Harmonization

Interstate Tax Coordination: Lessons from the International Fuel Tax Agreement

2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 591-603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwight Denison ◽  
Rex L. II Facer
Keyword(s):  
Tax Coordination ◽  
Fuel Tax

THE CONSEQUENCES OF TAXATION

2006 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Slemrod
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Design ◽  
Avoidance Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Responses ◽  
Elasticity Of Substitution ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Tax System ◽  
Tax Coordination ◽  
Taxable Income ◽  
Elasticity Of Taxable Income ◽  
The Government

The consequences of taxation matter for the optimal design of the tax system. Those consequences depend on behavioral responses to taxation, as summarized by the elasticity of taxable income. Although this elasticity depends on characteristics of preferences, such as the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure, it also depends on the avoidance technology, and on the response of government to avoidance behavior. It depends on the size of states, and the amount of tax coordination and harmonization. To some degree the elasticity of response can be affected by government policies, and the government need not accept it passively, but rather should put in place policies that optimally determine it.

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