Statism, Nationalism and the Associative Theory of Special Obligations

Theoria ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 58 (129) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Richard Child
Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Saul Smilansky

History is, indeed, little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind. Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire I argue that there are duties that can be called ‘Moral duties due to history’ or, in short, ‘Duties to History’ (DTH). My claim is not the familiar thought that we need to learn from history on how to live better in the present and going forward, but that history itself creates moral duties. In addition to those obligations we currently recognise in response to the present and the future, there also exist special obligations in response to the past. If convincing, this means that our lives ought to be guided, in part, not only by our obligations to the living but by our DTH. This is a surprising result, with significant and sometimes perplexing implications. My focus is on the obligations of individuals in the light of history rather than on collective duties. I argue that there are duties that can be called ‘Moral duties due to history’ or, in short, ‘Duties to History’ (DTH). My claim is not the familiar thought that we need to learn from history on how to live better in the present and going forward, but that history itself creates moral duties. In addition to those obligations we currently recognise in response to the present and the future, there also exist special obligations in response to the past; such as obligations to good people in the past, but going beyond them. If convincing, this means that our lives ought to be guided, in part, not only by our obligations to the living but by our DTH. This is a surprising result, with significant and sometimes perplexing implications. My focus is on the obligations of individuals in the light of history rather than on collective duties.


2021 ◽  

Cybersecurity is a central challenge for many companies. On the one hand, companies have to protect themselves against cyberattacks; on the other hand, they have special obligations towards third parties and the state in critical infrastructures or when dealing with personal data. These responsibilities converge with company management. This volume examines the duties and liability risks of management in connection with cyber security from the perspective of corporate, constitutional and labour law. The volume is based on a conference of the same name, which took place in cooperation with the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit on 23 and 24 October 2020 at Bucerius Law School in Hamburg. With contributions by Andreas Beyer, Marc Bittner, Alexander Brüggemeier, Anabel Guntermann, Katrin Haußmann, Dennis-Kenji Kipker, Christoph Benedikt Müller, Isabella Risini, Darius Rostam, Sarah Schmidt-Versteyl and Gerald Spindler.


Author(s):  
Stephen Macedo

This chapter examines the many “legal incidents” of marriage: the specific benefits, responsibilities, obligations, and protections that are associated with marriage by law. While critics focus on the special privileges or benefits that spouses acquire in marriage, those are balanced by special obligations. The chapter suggests that the whole package seems reasonably appropriate for both opposite-sex and same-sex couples. It also considers the ways in which marriage seems to promote the good of spouses, children, and society, along with the class divide that now characterizes marriage and parenting. It argues that this class divide, not same-sex marriage, is the great challenge for the future.


2019 ◽  
pp. 57-114
Author(s):  
David Phillips

This chapter interprets and defend Ross’s rejection of consequentialism and his endorsement of a moderate deontological position. It focuses particularly on what he says about promises, the special obligations he discusses most fully. It is argued that Ross treats promises as agent-relative intensifiers of reasons to promote goods; that there are other important kinds of agent-relative intensifiers recognized by Sidgwick but not by Ross; and that, unlike deontological constraints, agent-relative intensifiers are not puzzling or problematic. It is then argued, contra Robert Audi, that Ross should be interpreted as a classical deontologist rather than as a value-based intuitionist. And it is argued finally that Ross’s limited pluralism should be preferred to Jonathan Dancy’s particularism.


Philosophia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saul Smilansky

AbstractI explore the question of whether one has to reply to a paper such as this, and consider what a positive answer (in any respect) would teach us. I argue for a qualified Yes. By “reply” I refer to an attempt to write a paper responding to the original one, which addresses (some of) the major claims made in it. I first ask what philosophical papers are for, and note the important role played by replies to them. I consider special obligations to reply to philosophical papers; and the weaker pro tanto obligations that might exist for most professional philosophers. Finally, I consider objections to my claims; and the broader implications if my case is plausible.


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