scholarly journals Pure Powers Are Not Powerful Qualities

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. (A2)5-29
Author(s):  
Joaquim Giannotti

There is no consensus on the most adequate conception of the fundamental properties of our world. The pure powers view and the identity theory of powerful qualities claim to be promising alternatives to categoricalism, the view that all fundamental properties essentially contribute to the qualitative make-up of things that have them. The pure powers view holds that fundamental properties essentially empower things that have them with a distinctive causal profile. On the identity theory, fundamental properties are dispositional as well as qualitative, or powerful qualities. Despite the manifest difference, Taylor (2018) argues that pure powers and powerful qualities collapse into the same ontology. If this collapse objection were sound, the debate between the pure powers view and the identity theory of powerful qualities would be illusory: these views could claim the same advantages and would suffer the same problems. Here I defend an ontologically robust distinction between pure powers and powerful qualities. To accomplish this aim, I show that the collapse between pure powers and powerful qualities can be resisted. I conclude by drawing some positive implications of this result.

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Dondoni

AbstractOne of the most pressing challenges that occupy the Russellian panpsychist’s agenda is to come up with a way to reconcile the traditional argument from categorical properties (Seager Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 129–145, 2006; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015) with H. H. Mørch’s dispositionalism-friendly argument from the experience of causation (2014, Topoi, 39, 1073–1088, 2018, 2020) — on the way to a unitary, all-encompassing case for the view. In this regard, Mørch claims that, via the commitment to the Identity theory of properties, one can consistently hold both panpsychist arguments without contradiction (2020: 281) — I shall refer to such proposal as Reconciliation. In my paper, I shall argue that this is not the case. To this extent, I will first consider H. Taylor’s argument that the Identity theorists have the exact same resources as the dispositionalists (as, after careful enquiry, their views on the metaphysics of properties turn out to coincide (Philosophical Studies, 175, 1423–1440, 2018: 1438)), and thus contend that Reconciliation fails to obtain. Then, I will suggest that one can avoid the problem and reconcile the arguments by adopting a different version of the powerful qualities view, namely the Compound view — and thus advance a reformulated version of the claim, i.e. Reconciliation*. Finally, even though pursuing my proposed solution might expose Russellian panpsychism to the risk of epiphenomenalism, I shall conclude that such specific form of epiphenomenalism is a rather benign one, and thus that, via Reconciliation*, the constitution of a unitary case for panpsychism as a positive proposal (and not as a mere alternative to dualism and physicalism) can be achieved.


Metaphysica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-295
Author(s):  
Vassilis Livanios

AbstractUntil recently, the powerful qualities view about properties has been effectively identified with the so-called identity theory. Yet, the difficulties that the latter faces (especially concerning the interpretation of its core claim that dispositionality and qualitativity are identical) have led some metaphysicians to propose (at least provisionally) new versions of the powerful qualities view. This paper discusses the prospects of three such versions: the compound view, the higher-order properties theory and the dual aspect account. It is argued that the compound view is in fact property dualism in disguise, while the higher-order properties theory does not by itself provide a metaphysically convincing solution to Armstrong’s dilemma concerning the modal status of the relation between dispositionality and categoricality. Finally, it is argued that it is not clear whether the dual aspect account is distinct from identity theory and pure powerism.


2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jillian C. Banfield ◽  
Craig W. Blatz ◽  
Katherine B. Starzyk ◽  
Michael A. Ross

2003 ◽  
Vol 762 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. David Cohen

AbstractThis paper first briefly reviews a few of the early studies that established some of the salient features of light-induced degradation in a-Si,Ge:H. In particular, I discuss the fact that both Si and Ge metastable dangling bonds are involved. I then review some of the recent studies carried out by members of my laboratory concerning the details of degradation in the low Ge fraction alloys utilizing the modulated photocurrent method to monitor the individual changes in the Si and Ge deep defects. By relating the metastable creation and annealing behavior of these two types of defects, new insights into the fundamental properties of metastable defects have been obtained for amorphous silicon materials in general. I will conclude with a brief discussion of the microscopic mechanisms that may be responsible.


2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (8) ◽  
pp. 837-840
Author(s):  
Tsuguyuki Saito ◽  
Yuri Kobayashi ◽  
Shuji Fujisawa ◽  
Chun-Nan Wu ◽  
Akira Isogai

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