Certificateless Public Key Cryptography in the Standard Model

2018 ◽  
Vol 161 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-248
Author(s):  
Sébastien Canard ◽  
Viet Cuong Trinh
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Public Key Cryptography ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography ◽  
The Standard Model

Efficient Certificateless Signcryption in the Standard Model: Revisiting Luo and Wan’s Scheme from Wireless Personal Communications (2018)

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (8) ◽  
pp. 1178-1193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parvin Rastegari ◽  
Willy Susilo ◽  
Mohammad Dakhlalian
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Random Oracle Model ◽  
Personal Communication ◽  
Public Key Cryptography ◽  
Random Oracle ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Wireless Personal Communications

Abstract Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) promises a practical resolution in establishing practical schemes, since it addresses two fundamental issues, namely the necessity of requiring certificate managements in traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) and the key escrow problem in identity-based (ID-based) setting concurrently. Signcryption is an important primitive that provides the goals of both encryption and signature schemes as it is more efficient than encrypting and signing messages consecutively. Since the concept of certificateless signcryption (CL-SC) scheme was put forth by Barbosa and Farshim in 2008, many schemes have been proposed where most of them are provable in the random oracle model (ROM) and only a few number of them are provable in the standard model. Very recently, Luo and Wan (Wireless Personal Communication, 2018) proposed a very efficient CL-SC scheme in the standard model. Furthermore, they claimed that their scheme is not only more efficient than the previously proposed schemes in the standard model, but also it is the only scheme which benefits from known session-specific temporary information security (KSSTIS). Therefore, this scheme would indeed be very practical. The contributions of this paper are 2-fold. First, in contrast to the claim made by Luo and Wan, we show that unfortunately Luo and Wan made a significant error in the construction of their proposed scheme. While their main intention is indeed interesting and useful, the failure of their construction has indeed left a gap in the research literature. Hence, the second contribution of this paper is to fill this gap by proposing a CL-SC scheme with KSSTIS, which is provably secure in the standard model.

scholarly journals Secure Certificateless Signature with Revocation in the Standard Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tung-Tso Tsai ◽  
Sen-Shan Huang ◽  
Yuh-Min Tseng
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Public Key Cryptography ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Key Generation ◽  
Security Model ◽  
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography ◽  
Random Oracles ◽  
Diffie Hellman ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Certificateless Signature

Certificateless public key cryptography is very attractive in solving the key escrow problem which is inherent in identity- (ID-) based public key cryptography. In the past, a large number of certificateless cryptographic schemes and protocols were presented, but a secure certificateless signature in the standard model (without random oracles) is still not accessible until now. To the best of our knowledge, all the previously proposed certificateless signature schemes were insecure under a considerably strong security model in the sense that they suffered from outsiders’ key replacement attacks or the attacks from the key generation center (KGC). In this paper, we propose a certificateless signature scheme without random oracles. Moreover, our scheme is secure under the strong security model and provides a public revocation mechanism, called revocable certificateless signature (RCLS). Under the standard computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we formally demonstrate that our scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks.

scholarly journals A Short Server-Aided Certificateless Aggregate Multisignature Scheme in the Standard Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viet Cuong Trinh
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Public Key Cryptography ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Constant Size ◽  
Aggregate Signature ◽  
Diffie Hellman ◽  
Combination Scheme ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
Short Signature

Aggregate signature scheme allows each signer to sign a different message and then all those signatures are aggregated into a single short signature. In contrast, multisignature scheme allows multisigners to jointly sign only one message. Aggregate multisignature scheme is a combination of both aforementioned signature schemes, where signers can choose to generate either a multisignature or an aggregate signature. This combination scheme has many concrete application scenarios such as Bitcoin blockchain, Healthcare, Multicast Acknowledgment Aggregation, and so on. On the other hand, to deal with the problems of expensive certificates in certified public key cryptography and key escrow in identity-based cryptography, the notion of certificateless public key cryptography has been introduced by Riyami and Paterson at Asiacrypt’03. In this paper, we propose the first certificateless aggregate multisignature scheme that achieves the constant-size of signature and is secure in the standard model under a generalization of the Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption. In our scheme, however, the signature is generated with the help of the authority.

On the Security of a Certificateless Signature Scheme

2014 ◽  
Vol 519-520 ◽  
pp. 965-968
Author(s):  
Lin Cheng ◽  
Qiao Yan Wen
Keyword(s):  
System Parameter ◽  
Public Key Cryptography ◽  
Public Key Infrastructure ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Signature Scheme ◽  
System Parameters ◽  
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
Certificateless Signature

Certificateless public key cryptography eliminates inherent key escrow problem in identity-based cryptography, and does not yet requires certificates as in the traditional public key infrastructure. Recently, Yu et al. propose a new certificateless signature scheme and their scheme offers shorter system parameters and higher computational efficiency than the previous schemes in the standard model. However, in this paper, we show Yu et al.'s certificateless signature scheme is vulnerable to malicious-but-passive KGC attack where a malicious KGC can forge valid signatures by embedding extra trapdoors in the system parameter.

Lattice-based completely non-malleable public-key encryption in the standard model

2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reza Sepahi ◽  
Ron Steinfeld ◽  
Josef Pieprzyk
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
The Standard Model

Public-Key Encryption In The Standard Model Against Strong Leakage Adversary

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (12) ◽  
pp. 1904-1914
Author(s):  
Janaka Alawatugoda
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Log P ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Security Parameter ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Encryption Schemes ◽  
Leakage Resilient

Abstract Over the years, security against adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2) is considered as the strongest security definition for public-key encryption schemes. With the uprise of side-channel attacks, new security definitions are proposed, addressing leakage of secret keys together with the standard CCA2 definition. Among the new security definitions, security against continuous and after-the-fact leakage-resilient CCA2 can be considered as the strongest security definition, which is called as security against (continuous) adaptively chosen-ciphertext leakage attacks (continuous CCLA2). In this paper, we present a construction of a public-key encryption scheme, namely LR-PKE, which satisfies the aforementioned security definition. The security of our public-key encryption scheme is proven in the standard model, under decision BDH assumption. Thus, we emphasize that our public-key encryption scheme LR-PKE is (continuous) CCLA2-secure in the standard model. For our construction of LR-PKE, we have used a strong one-time signature scheme and a leakage-resilient refreshing protocol as underlying building blocks. The leakage bound is $0.15n\log p -1$ bits per leakage query, for a security parameter $k$ and a statistical security parameter $n$, such that $\log p \geq k$ and $n$ is a function of $k$. It is possible to see that LR-PKE is efficient enough to be used for real-world usage.

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