scholarly journals Anchored Team Formation Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Schlueter ◽  
Christian Addington ◽  
Judy Goldsmith
Keyword(s):  
Role Playing ◽  
Deterministic Algorithm ◽  
Team Formation ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
New Class ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Stable Coalition ◽  
Np Hardness

We propose Anchored Team Formation Games (ATFGs), a new class of hedonic game inspired by tabletop role playing games.We establish the NP-hardness of determining whether Nash stable coalition structures exist, and provide results for three heuristics for this problem. We highlight costs and benefits of each heuristic and provide evidence that all three are capable of finding Nash stable coalition structures, when they exist, much more quickly than a deterministic algorithm.

scholarly journals Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yukihiko Funaki ◽  
Takehiko Yamato
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Stable Coalition

An algorithm for computing the stable coalition structures in tree-graph communication games

Top ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-80
Author(s):  
Fritz H. Grafe ◽  
Elena Inarra ◽  
Ana Mauleon
Keyword(s):  
Tree Graph ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Communication Games ◽  
Stable Coalition

Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 478-482
Author(s):  
Vasily V. Gusev ◽  
Vladimir V. Mazalov
Keyword(s):  
Potential Functions ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Stable Coalition

STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450006 ◽  
Author(s):  
YUKIHIKO FUNAKI ◽  
TAKEHIKO YAMATO
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Grand Coalition ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Stable Coalition ◽  
Stability Concept

In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.

A Dynamic Game Approach for Analyzing the Coalitional Stability of Cascaded Hydropower Stations

2012 ◽  
Vol 562-564 ◽  
pp. 1544-1548
Author(s):  
Heng Li Song ◽  
Chao Yuan Yue
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Social Benefit ◽  
Western Region ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
The Social ◽  
Stable Coalition ◽  
Coalitional Stability ◽  
Dynamic Cooperation ◽  
Hydropower Stations

A game model is proposed to discuss the possible coalition structures of hydropower stations. The stable coalition structures in different contexts of electricity markets are derived on basic of numerical simulation using the raw data of three hydropower stations on the middle and lower reaches of some river in China's south-western region as a case. The coalitional stability is analyzed by a dynamic cooperation game approach using the conception of LCS and EPCS. The total purchase power fees of the grid in three coalition structures are calculated and compared to analyze the effects of coalition structures on the social benefit.

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