A Study on the Integration of Framework National Tax Basic Act and Local Tax Basic Act

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-103
Author(s):  
Woo-Young Kim ◽  
Keum-Young Kim
Keyword(s):  
1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
SVEN STEINMO ◽  
CAROLINE J. TOLBERT

New institutionalism has emerged as one of the most prominent research agendas in the field of comparative politics, political economy, and public policy. This article examines the role of institutional variation in political/economic regimes in shaping tax burdens in industrialized democracies. An institutionalist model for tax policy variation is tested across the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) democracies. Countries are conceptualized and statistically modeled in terms of majoritarian, shifting coalition, and dominant coalition governments. Regression analysis and cluster analysis are used to statistically model cross-national tax burdens relative to the strength of labor organization and party dominance in parliament. This study finds that political and economic institutions are important in explaining tax policy variation. Specifying the structure of political and economic institutions helps to explain the size of the state in modern capitalist democracies. This article specifies and demonstrates which institutions matter and how much they matter.


1966 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-172
Author(s):  
RICHARD W. LINDHOLM

1950 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-265
Author(s):  
LEO MATTERSDORF
Keyword(s):  

1945 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 34-34
Author(s):  
DIXWELL L. PIERCE
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Hertel-Fernandez ◽  
Theda Skocpol

Arguments about national tax policy have taken center stage in U.S. politics in recent times, creating acute dilemmas for Democrats. With Republicans locked into antitax agendas for some time, Democrats have recently begun to push back, arguing for maintaining or even increasing taxes on the very wealthy in the name of deficit reduction and the need to sustain funding for public programs. But the Democratic Party as a whole has not been able to find a consistent voice on tax issues. It experienced key defections when large, upward-tilting tax cuts were enacted under President George W. Bush, and the Democratic Party could not control the agenda on debates over continuing those tax cuts even when it enjoyed unified control in Washington, DC, in 2009 and 2010. To explain these cleavages among Democrats, we examine growing pressures from small business owners, a key antitax constituency. We show that organizations claiming to speak for small business have become more active in tax politics in recent decades, and we track the ways in which constituency pressures have been enhanced by feedbacks from federal tax rules that encourage individuals to pass high incomes through legal preferences for the self-employed. Comparing debates over the inception and renewal of the Bush tax cuts, we show how small business organizations and constituencies have divided Democrats on tax issues. Our findings pinpoint the mechanisms that have propelled tax resistance in contemporary U.S. politics, and our analysis contributes to theoretical understandings of the ways in which political parties are influenced by policy feedbacks and by coalitions of policy-driven organized economic interests.


Author(s):  
Galina Titarenko ◽  
Oleksandra Titarenko

In the article the issue of concepts of natural resource rent and rent payment differentiation is actualized. It is stated that rent payment can be considered only that payment, which is made from entrepreneurial profit in the amount, which is caused by the difference between its normal level and surplus. The main criteria for rent payment are the following: it is shown as part of the entrepreneur's income. If you do not expect to receive entrepreneurial income, then such a payment can not be considered as rent. Then it is only a payment for the use of a resource in an economic activity, that is, a fee (formed at a cost approach or as a result of market equilibrium mechanisms) or a levy (quasi-fiscal fiscal payment of a permissive nature, that is, a fiscal levy), or a license fee for the use of a resource; it is paid not for the fact of using the resource in economic activity, but for receiving excess entrepreneurial income for the labor and capital expended because of more favorable conditions than other entrepreneurs. If there is no such excess profit, then the rent payment cannot be considered as it does not have an excess, rent component. It is noted that the rent payment today is a payment for the use of the resource or property rights tax, instead of fully removing the rent from the user's income. It is pointed out the need to revise the terminology used in the tax legislation, to clearly distinguish between concepts and, accordingly, fiscal instruments, such as: the fee for the special use of the resource, which is compensatory, compensatory and unconditionally paid by the natural resource for the involvement of the natural resource in its economic management and use economic purposes; the object of taxation is actually the resource (its quality, quantity), and the fact that determines the fiscal obligation is the exploitation of the resource by the user; tax, which is of a general nature and is paid by the owner of the taxable resource, whether or not the resource is used in business and income generation; rent (payment), which should be deducted from entrepreneurial profits in order to remove the income earned by an entrepreneur from his or her certain advantages over other entrepreneurs of the industry or business sector due to more favorable conditions than other business entities. Amendments to the national tax legislation need to be made to clearly define the terminology and appropriate mechanisms for applying these fiscal instruments in the economic activity of the state, which will, on the one hand, effectively tax property and apply a mechanism for levying resources to offset environmental costs, and the other is to fully remove from the entrepreneurs the rents they have earned for government purposes.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document