scholarly journals Application specific product qualification report for uninterruptible power supplies used in nuclear reactors R1 and R2

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Sadeghi
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Electronic System ◽  
Power Supplies ◽  
Safe Operation ◽  
Specific Product ◽  
Uninterruptible Power Supplies ◽  
Uninterruptible Power ◽  
Application Specific

Safety is the most important aspect and is considered the overwriting priority in nuclear power plants, which comprise of thousands of systems and components that work systematically together for the purpose of generating electricity in a safe, economical and environmentally friendly manner. As the instrumentation and electrical components advance and become more sophisticated and migrate from analog design to the more complicated and error-prone software-based topology, the task of determining that a programmable electronic system (PES) is capable of meeting its safety-related design objective becomes ever more challenging. The dependence on the PES to accomplish its safety-related object must be thoroughly studied to assess the safety-related impacts associated with the potential failure modes of the device. Application Specific Product Qualification (ASPQ) is used to provide neccessay aasurance in the design integrity of a PES and confirms that the product can meet the requirements of a safety-related application. This report is an application specific product qualification (ASPQ) assessment of WEP 1010-110/120-NEA and WEP 1020-110/120-NEA Uninterruptible Power Supplies manufactured by Gambit Electronic Ltd. Information referenced in this report is based on the data received from Gambit, other nuclear power plants using Gambit products and the site visit paid to Gambit, Country-X in August 2007. Gambit WEP 1010- and 10XX-XXX/YY NEA UPS systems are used to provide uninterruptible Class II power to a number of safety-related control and instrumentation power distribution panels for R1 and R2 reactors located in X facility. These UPS are commercial Off-the Shelf (COTS) products intended for industrial uninterruptible power supply applications. An earlier Categorization Assessment Report concluded that UPS perform Category B safety-related functions and therefore, they must be qualified to meet the safety requirements associated with a Class BProgrammable Electronic System (PES) as per IEC 61513.A combination of methods were utilized to demonstrate that the UPS systems were suitable for the target applications, were inherently correct in design, and came with sufficient documentation to allow safe operation by the plant. The key findings of this report indicate that the aforementioned UPS systems are suitable for use in the target application, have strong evidence of reliability through field experience and various product certifications that support correctness of their design and come with thorough documentation that support safe operation and suitability assessment. Two major recommendations made in this report are to establishing a Preventive Maintenance (PM) program by the station to perform replacement of life-limiting components at the minimum frequencies specified by the manufacturerer, and to set ip an inspection and testing program by the station to perform minimum -monthly testing of the output power quality of the UPS systems to minimize the possibility of partial failure, which is the failure of concern and relates to a situation where the loads are supplied with out-of-specification power, undetected.

scholarly journals Application specific product qualification report for uninterruptible power supplies used in nuclear reactors R1 and R2

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Sadeghi
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Electronic System ◽  
Power Supplies ◽  
Safe Operation ◽  
Specific Product ◽  
Uninterruptible Power Supplies ◽  
Uninterruptible Power ◽  
Application Specific

Safety is the most important aspect and is considered the overwriting priority in nuclear power plants, which comprise of thousands of systems and components that work systematically together for the purpose of generating electricity in a safe, economical and environmentally friendly manner. As the instrumentation and electrical components advance and become more sophisticated and migrate from analog design to the more complicated and error-prone software-based topology, the task of determining that a programmable electronic system (PES) is capable of meeting its safety-related design objective becomes ever more challenging. The dependence on the PES to accomplish its safety-related object must be thoroughly studied to assess the safety-related impacts associated with the potential failure modes of the device. Application Specific Product Qualification (ASPQ) is used to provide neccessay aasurance in the design integrity of a PES and confirms that the product can meet the requirements of a safety-related application. This report is an application specific product qualification (ASPQ) assessment of WEP 1010-110/120-NEA and WEP 1020-110/120-NEA Uninterruptible Power Supplies manufactured by Gambit Electronic Ltd. Information referenced in this report is based on the data received from Gambit, other nuclear power plants using Gambit products and the site visit paid to Gambit, Country-X in August 2007. Gambit WEP 1010- and 10XX-XXX/YY NEA UPS systems are used to provide uninterruptible Class II power to a number of safety-related control and instrumentation power distribution panels for R1 and R2 reactors located in X facility. These UPS are commercial Off-the Shelf (COTS) products intended for industrial uninterruptible power supply applications. An earlier Categorization Assessment Report concluded that UPS perform Category B safety-related functions and therefore, they must be qualified to meet the safety requirements associated with a Class BProgrammable Electronic System (PES) as per IEC 61513.A combination of methods were utilized to demonstrate that the UPS systems were suitable for the target applications, were inherently correct in design, and came with sufficient documentation to allow safe operation by the plant. The key findings of this report indicate that the aforementioned UPS systems are suitable for use in the target application, have strong evidence of reliability through field experience and various product certifications that support correctness of their design and come with thorough documentation that support safe operation and suitability assessment. Two major recommendations made in this report are to establishing a Preventive Maintenance (PM) program by the station to perform replacement of life-limiting components at the minimum frequencies specified by the manufacturerer, and to set ip an inspection and testing program by the station to perform minimum -monthly testing of the output power quality of the UPS systems to minimize the possibility of partial failure, which is the failure of concern and relates to a situation where the loads are supplied with out-of-specification power, undetected.

Components Qualification for the Safe Operation of Nuclear Power Plants

2017 ◽  
pp. 337-349
Author(s):  
Holger Schmidt ◽  
Martin Betz ◽  
Ingo Ganzmann ◽  
Achim Beisiegel ◽  
Thomas Wagner ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Safe Operation

Securing safe operation of VVÉR reactor systems in nuclear power plants

Atomic Energy ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 539-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu. G. Dragunov ◽  
V. P. Denisov
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Vver Reactor ◽  
Safe Operation

scholarly journals Effective Outage Planning and Implementation for Nuclear Power Plants in the UK

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Reece-Barkell ◽  
W. J. J. Vorster
Keyword(s):  
Pressure Vessel ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Pressure Vessels ◽  
Valuable Insight ◽  
Safe Operation ◽  
Implementation Phase ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Insight Into

Effective outage planning and implementation is critical to the efficient and safe operation of commercial nuclear power plants in the UK. Statutory outages are necessary for refuelling, for preventive and corrective maintenance when shutdown conditions are required, and for major modification and improvement projects. Outages involve the support of many companies and individuals working together and, as such, require high levels of coordination. Planning of activities before the outage is critical to the overall success of the outage. Establishing the integrity of power plant piping and pressure vessels is a key objective as part of any outage and the methodology and processes involved are the subject of this paper. Establishing the integrity of piping and pressure vessels requires an understanding of the specific threats, their relationship to the overall condition of the system, and the mitigating measures required to assure safe operation. Understanding the specific threats allows the engineering function of an organisation to advise on pipework and pressure vessel ‘Minimum Acceptable Thicknesses’ which can be used to assure integrity via comparison with thicknesses measured during outage inspections. Minimum Acceptable Thicknesses should be recorded in the outage management documentation so they are accessible during the outage implementation phase. Historically a variety of different methodologies have been used to advise on Minimum Acceptable Thickness requirements including design drawing specified minimum thicknesses, design code based required thicknesses and thicknesses calculated based on Fitness for Purpose methods. It is important that a robust procedure be applied to promote consistency of approach as regards the calculation of pipework and pressure vessel Minimum Acceptable Thickness requirements across all power station assets. An additional consideration is that of ensuring that the approach adopted is consistent with high level safety case guidance, i.e., the assessment is appropriate for the failure tolerability of the plant item. This paper provides an overview of the strategy, methodologies and processes employed to determine Minimum Acceptable Thicknesses for pipework components. These ensure that, over a specified inspection interval, were the weld/component to be defect free, it would not fail due to any of the relevant failure mechanisms, which typically are plastic collapse, creep rupture, fatigue, incremental collapse (ratcheting) or buckling. Readers of this paper will gain a valuable insight into the statutory outage process applicable to nuclear power plants in the UK. A particular focus of this paper is on the structural integrity assessments applied in a non-traditional sense prior to, during and after the statutory outage. As well as sharing a valuable insight into the assessment methodologies this paper highlights best industrial practice.

Building Effective Organizations and Measures to Cope With Severe Weather in Qinshan III NPP

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Weather Conditions ◽  
Severe Weather ◽  
Effective Management ◽  
Safe Operation ◽  
Standard Response

Severe weather such as typhoon has long been a great challenge threats the safe operation of nuclear power plants. To cope with typhoon, Qinshan III NPP has developed an effective management system, including building powerful organizations, creating standard response procedures and consumable storage, which proven to be effective to ensure the safe operation of Qinshan III plant under severe weather conditions.

A Procedure for Determining the Safe Operation Time of Equipment and Pipelines Based on Nondestructive Testing Results

Vestnik MEI ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 11-17
Author(s):  
Dmitriy A. Kuz'min ◽  
◽  
Aleksandr Yu. Kuz'michevskiy ◽  
Artem E. Gusarov ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
High Pressure ◽  
Wall Thickness ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Operation Time ◽  
Safe Operation ◽  
Accelerated Corrosion ◽  
Equipment And Pipelines ◽  
Flow Accelerated Corrosion

The reliability of nuclear power plants (NPPs) has an influence on power generation safety and stability. The reliability of NPP equipment and pipelines (E&P), and the frequency of in-service inspections are directly linked with damage mechanisms and their development rates. Flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) is one of significant factors causing damages to E&P because these components experience the influence of high pressure, temperature, and high flow velocity of the inner medium. The majority of feed and steam path components made of pearlitic steels are prone to this kind of wear. The tube elements used in the coils of high pressure heaters (HPH) operating in the secondary coolant circuit of nuclear power plants equipped with a VVER-1000 reactor plant were taken as the subject of the study. The time dependences of changes in the wall thickness in HPH tube elements are studied proceeding from an analysis of statistical data of in-service nondestructive tests. A method for determining the initial state of the E&P metal wall thickness before the commencement of operation is proposed. The article presents a procedure for predicting the distribution of examined objects' wall thicknesses at different times of operation with determining the occurrence probability of damages caused by flow accelerated corrosion to calculate the time of safe operation until reaching a critical state. A function that determines the boundary of permissible values of the HPH wall thickness distributions is obtained, and it is shown that the intervals of in-service inspections can be increased from 6 years (the actual frequency of inspections) to 9 years, and the next in-service inspection is recommended to be carried out after 7.5 years of operation. A method for determining the existence of FAC-induced local thinning in the examined object has been developed. The developed approaches and obtained study results can be adapted for any pipelines prone to wall thinning to determine the frequency of in-service inspections (including an express analysis based on the results of a single nondestructive in-service test), the safe operation time, and quantitative assessment of the critical value reaching probability.

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