scholarly journals The Distorted Grade Distribution: Inflating Grades Post the 1980s

Keyword(s):  
HortScience ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 550d-550
Author(s):  
Eric H. Simonne ◽  
John T. Owen

The retail value of yellow and red bell peppers is usually three to five times higher than that of the green ones. However, colored bell pepper production in Alabama is presently limited because most growers do not wait the additional 3 to 6 days needed for marketable green pepper to develop color. Hence, drip-irrigated yellow `Admiral' and `Goldcoast' and red `Bell Star' and `Capsitrano' bell peppers were grown in single row and bare-ground, and harvested as needed between July and October 1997 at the 0/3 (green), 1/3 or 2/3 colored stages. The interaction variety × picking method was not signficant (P > 0.50). Early (9,136 kg/ha) and total (32,363 kg/ha) yields of green (0/3) peppers were significantly (P < 0.05) higher than those of the 1/3 and 2/3 colored ones (5,166 and 27,235 kg/ha, respectively). Higher green yields were mainly due to increased numbers of marketable fruits rather than increased fruit size. The longer the pods stayed on the plants, the more likely was sunscald to occur. Retail values (/ha) for the early fancy grade were $10,800 and $20,500 for the green and colored peppers, respectively (using $2 and $6/kg, respectively). These results suggest that the present higher retail value of the colored bell peppers off-sets the lower expected yields.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-140
Author(s):  
Peter G. Arthur ◽  
Reza Zareie ◽  
Paul Kirkwood ◽  
Martha Ludwig ◽  
Paul V. Attwood

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua L. Mayfield ◽  
Eric H. Simonne ◽  
Charles C. Mitchell ◽  
Jeff L. Sibley ◽  
D. Joseph Eakes ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Michel Balinski ◽  
Rida Laraki

This chapter compares majority judgment mechanism to other methods, including first-past-the-post and Borda’s method, among others, in the context of the game of voting. The concept of utilities, which depends on grade distribution of the electorate, is extended to election output. When the identity of the election winner is dependent on the utilities of voters, Condorcet-winner is elected by a large number of strong-equilibria strategy-profiles. The chapter explores best-response correspondence, according to which, if the number of possible equilibria is very small and sometimes unique, the Condorcet-winner emerges as the unique, possible equilibrium outcome and honest votes determine the election outcome.


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