scholarly journals Global Liquidity Trap

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ippei Fujiwara ◽  
Tomoyuki Nakajima ◽  
Nao Sudo ◽  
Yuki Teranishi

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 (56) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ippei Fujiwara ◽  
◽  
Nao Sudo ◽  
Tomoyuki Nakajima ◽  
Yuki Teranishi ◽  
...  


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 190-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Cook ◽  
Michael B Devereux

This paper analyzes optimal policy responses to a global liquidity trap. The key feature of this environment is that relative prices respond perversely. A fall in demand in one country causes an appreciation of its terms of trade, exacerbating the initial shock. At the zero bound, this country cannot counter this shock. Then it may be optimal for the partner country to raise interest rates. The partner may set a positive policy interest rate, even though its “natural interest rate” is below zero. An optimal policy response requires a mutual interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. (JEL E12, E32, E44, E52, E62, F44, G01)



2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ippei Fujiwara ◽  
Tomoyuki Nakajima ◽  
Nao Sudou ◽  
Yuki Teranishi


2013 ◽  
Vol 60 (8) ◽  
pp. 936-949 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ippei Fujiwara ◽  
Tomoyuki Nakajima ◽  
Nao Sudo ◽  
Yuki Teranishi


2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 (51) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ippei Fujiwara ◽  
◽  
Kozo Ueda ◽  


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ippei Fujiwara ◽  
Tomoyuki Nakajima ◽  
Nao Sudou ◽  
Yuki Teranishi


2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (7) ◽  
pp. 1264-1283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ippei Fujiwara ◽  
Kozo Ueda




2012 ◽  
pp. 61-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ershov

According to the latest forecasts, it will take 10 years for the world economy to get back to “decent shape”. Some more critical estimates suggest that the whole western world will have a “colossal mess” within the next 5–10 years. Regulators of some major countries significantly and over a short time‑period changed their forecasts for the worse which means that uncertainty in the outlook for the future persists. Indeed, the intensive anti‑crisis measures have reduced the severity of the past problems, however the problems themselves have not disappeared. Moreover, some of them have become more intense — the eurocrisis, excessive debts, global liquidity glut against the backdrop of its deficit in some of market segments. As was the case prior to the crisis, derivatives and high‑risk operations with “junk” bonds grow; budget problems — “fiscal cliff” in the US — and other problems worsen. All of the above forces the regulators to take unprecedented (in their scope and nature) steps. Will they be able to tackle the problems which emerge?



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