Dealing with Monetary Paralysis at the Zero Bound

Recently, the key constraint for central banks is the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Central banks fear that if they push short-term policy interest rates too deeply negative, there will be a massive flight into paper currency. This paper asks whether, in a world where paper currency is becoming increasingly vestigial outside small transactions (at least in the legal, tax compliant economy), there might be relatively simple ways to finesse the zero bound without affecting how most ordinary people live. Surprisingly, this question gets little attention compared to the massive number of articles that take the zero bound as given and look for out-of-the-box solutions for dealing with it. In an inversion of the old joke, it is a bit as if the economics literature has insisted on positing “assume we don't have a can opener,” without considering the possibility that we might be able to devise one. It makes sense not to wait until the next financial crisis to develop plans. Fundamentally, there is no practical obstacle to paying negative (or positive) interest rates on electronic currency and, as we shall see, effective negative rate policy does not require eliminating paper currency.

Conclusions

The preceding chapters have examined the deepened integration of emerging and developing economies (EDEs) into the international financial system in the new millennium and their changing vulnerabilities to external financial shocks. They have discussed the role that policies in advanced economies played in this process, including those that culminated in the global financial crisis and the unconventional monetary policy of zero-bound interest rates and quantitative easing adopted in response to the crisis, as well as policies in EDEs themselves....

Impact of Quantitative Easing on Purchased Asset Yields, its Persistency and Overlap

The main focus of this paper rests on the event study and SVAR analysis of quantitative easing that was initiated as a reaction to the financial crisis at the turn of 2008/2009 that finally ended in 2014. The Fed was virtually unable to continue with its conventional monetary policy regime in environment of zero-bound threshold, where there is no easy way to decrease main monetary policy rate any further. As a reaction to this limitation, the Fed started to practice quantitative easing and other unconventional measures. Event study examines changes in yields of purchased assets, namely US Treasuries, MBS and agency debt, and on two-day event window of the OIS and yield spreads quantifies imminent impact of QE announcements and relevant chairman speeches. Following VAR model and impulse-response functions, I examine the impact of QE and its persistency on purchased asset and on alternative asset classes in the framework of various transmission channels such as signalling, portfolio-balancing and liquidity channels. In this study I found non-negligible impact of QE on purchased assets in both models through all waves of QE and time persistency patterns in IRFs part. Furthermore, some evidence for portfolio-balancing channel and other related channels was found.

The Great Escape? A Quantitative Evaluation of the Fed's Liquidity Facilities

We introduce liquidity frictions into an otherwise standard DSGE model with nominal and real rigidities and ask: can a shock to the liquidity of private paper lead to a collapse in short-term nominal interest rates and a recession like the one associated with the 2008 US financial crisis? Once the nominal interest rate reaches the zero bound, what are the effects of interventions in which the government provides liquidity in exchange for illiquid private paper? We find that the effects of the liquidity shock can be large, and show some numerical examples in which the liquidity facilities of the Federal Reserve prevented a repeat of the Great Depression in the period 2008–2009. (JEL E13, E31, E43, E44, E52, E58, G01)