scholarly journals The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances

Animals ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1054
Author(s):  
Jeroen Hopster

This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant (‘species-relativism’). Third, if we adopt Singer’s definition of speciesism, then a limitation of the current debate is that it is not obvious whether the core ethical principle that underlies anti-speciesist positions—the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests—is widely applicable. Arguably, the interests of animals are often too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration amounts to. I underscore the need for integrating philosophical and empirical research, to come to terms with the extent to which the interests of members of different species are alike, and with the question of whether any dissimilarities might be morally relevant.

Author(s):  
Neil Sinclair

This chapter argues that evolutionary debunking arguments are dialectically ineffective. Such arguments rely on the premise that moral judgements can be given evolutionary explanations which do not invoke their truth. The challenge for the debunker is to bridge the gap between this premise and the conclusion that moral judgements are unjustified. After discussing older attempts to bridge this gap, this chapter focuses on Joyce’s recent attempt, which claims that ‘we do not have a believable account of how moral facts could explain the mechanisms…which give rise to moral judgements’. It argues that whether there is such an account depends on what it is permissible to assume about moral truth and that it is reasonable to make assumptions which allow for the possibility of at least partial moral epistemologies. The challenge for the debunker is to show that these assumptions are unreasonable in a way which does not render their debunking argument superfluous.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Bagwell

Eliminativists sometimes invoke evolutionary debunking arguments against ordinary object beliefs, either to help them establish object skepticism or to soften the appeal of commonsense ontology. I argue that object debunkers face a self-defeat problem: their conclusion undermines the scientific support for one of their premises, because evolutionary biology depends on our object beliefs. Using work on reductionism and multiple realizability from the philosophy of science, I argue that it will not suffice for an eliminativist debunker to simply appeal to some object-free surrogate theory of evolution that results from converting any scientific proposition about some object K into a proposition about simples arranged K-wise. In the process, I examine some hazards peculiar to eliminative reductions of scientific theories, and propose a trilemma for eliminativists who attempt to recoup generality for ontologically sparse reducing theories by appealing to pluralities of simples arranged K-wise. The paper is intended to define and develop the object debunker’s self-defeat problem for further study, and to clarify some of the ways sparse and abundant ontologies interact with scientific theory.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Ewa Manikowska ◽  
Andrzej Jakubowski

This article seeks to contribute to the current debate on the new definition of the “museum” – a debate which led to turmoil at the 2019 ICOM General Assembly in Kyoto. With reference to the case study of the Museum of the Second World War in Gdansk (MSWW), it analyses the new and very successful genre of the narrative museum, a genre which arguably fulfils the core elements of the definition currently being discussed by ICOM. In this regard, it brings into focus the paramount importance of community involvement in creating and managing narrative museums – an aspect that has been virtually absent in the academic and media debates over the nature of the MSWW and its programme. By pointing out the fragility of the foundations for such participation, based solely on trust between communities, the museum, and state authorities, this article calls for and provides guidance for an academic and institutional redefinition of the narrative museum and the institution of a museum in general.


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