scholarly journals Term Logic

Axioms ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Simons

The predominant form of logic before Frege, the logic of terms has been largely neglected since. Terms may be singular, empty or plural in their denotation. This article, presupposing propositional logic, provides an axiomatization based on an identity predicate, a predicate of non-existence, a constant empty term, and term conjunction and negation. The idea of basing term logic on existence or non-existence, outlined by Brentano, is here carried through in modern guise. It is shown how categorical syllogistic reduces to just two forms of inference. Tree and diagram methods of testing validity are described. An obvious translation into monadic predicate logic shows the system is decidable, and additional expressive power brought by adding quantifiers enables numerical predicates to be defined. The system’s advantages for pedagogy are indicated.

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
MAJID ALIZADEH ◽  
FARZANEH DERAKHSHAN ◽  
HIROAKIRA ONO

AbstractUniform interpolation property of a given logic is a stronger form of Craig’s interpolation property where both pre-interpolant and post-interpolant always exist uniformly for any provable implication in the logic. It is known that there exist logics, e.g., modal propositional logic S4, which have Craig’s interpolation property but do not have uniform interpolation property. The situation is even worse for predicate logics, as classical predicate logic does not have uniform interpolation property as pointed out by L. Henkin.In this paper, uniform interpolation property of basic substructural logics is studied by applying the proof-theoretic method introduced by A. Pitts (Pitts, 1992). It is shown that uniform interpolation property holds even for their predicate extensions, as long as they can be formalized by sequent calculi without contraction rules. For instance, uniform interpolation property of full Lambek predicate calculus, i.e., the substructural logic without any structural rule, and of both linear and affine predicate logics without exponentials are proved.


Pragmatics ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter A.M. Seuren

This paper aims at an explanation of the discrepancies between natural intuitions and standard logic in terms of a distinction between NATURAL and CONSTRUCTED levels of cognition, applied to the way human cognition deals with sets. NATURAL SET THEORY (NST) restricts standard set theory cutting it down to naturalness. The restrictions are then translated into a theory of natural logic. The predicate logic resulting from these restrictions turns out to be that proposed in Hamilton (1860) and Jespersen (1917). Since, in this logic, NO is a quantifier in its own right, different from NOT-SOME, and given the assumption that natural lexicalization processes occur at the level of basic naturalness, single-morpheme lexicalizations for NOT-ALL should not occur, just as there is no single-morpheme lexicalization for NOT-SOME at that level. An analogous argument is developed for the systematic absence of lexicalizations for NOT-AND in propositional logic.


1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 705-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. H. Löb

Some syntactically simple fragments of intuitionistic logic possess considerable expressive power compared with their classical counterparts.In particular, we consider in this paper intuitionistic second order propositional logic (ISPL) a formalisation of which may be obtained by adding to the intuitionistic propositional calculus quantifiers binding propositional variables together with the usual quantifier rules and the axiom scheme (Ex), where is a formula not containing x.The main purpose of this paper is to show that the classical first order predicate calculus with identity can be (isomorphically) embedded in ISPL.It turns out an immediate consequence of this that the classical first order predicate calculus with identity can also be embedded in the fragment (PLA) of the intuitionistic first order predicate calculus whose only logical symbols are → and (.) (universal quantifier) and the only nonlogical symbol (apart from individual variables and parentheses) a single monadic predicate letter.Another consequence is that the classical first order predicate calculus can be embedded in the theory of Heyting algebras.The undecidability of the formal systems under consideration evidently follows immediately from the present results.We shall indicate how the methods employed may be extended to show also that the intuitionistic first order predicate calculus with identity can be embedded in both ISPL and PLA.For the purpose of the present paper it will be convenient to use the following formalisation (S) of ISPL based on [3], rather than the one given above.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 522-555
Author(s):  
JOOP LEO

AbstractA new logic is presented without predicates—except equality. Yet its expressive power is the same as that of predicate logic, and relations can faithfully be represented in it. In this logic we also develop an alternative for set theory. There is a need for such a new approach, since we do not live in a world of sets and predicates, but rather in a world of things with relations between them.


1959 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshio Umezawa

In [1] and [2] I investigated logics intermediate between intuitionistic and classical propositional logic. In the present paper I shall study inclusion and non-inclusion between certain intermediate predicate logics. All the logics considered result from intuitionistic predicate logic by addition of classically valid axiom schemes.


1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heath

Recent developments in game theory have shown that the mathematical models of action so widely admired in the study of economics are in fact only particular instantiations of a more general theoretical framework. In the same way that Aristotelian logic was ‘translated’ into the more general and expressive language of predicate logic, the basic action theoretic underpinnings of modern economics have now been articulated within the more comprehensive language of game theory. But precisely because of its greater generality and expressive power, game theory has again revived the temptation to apply formal models of action to every domain of social life. This movement has been fuelled by some notable successes. Game theory has provided useful insights into the logic of collective action in the theory of public goods, and strategic models of voting have illustrated important aspects of institutional decision-making. But this extension of formal models into every area of social interaction has also encountered significant difficulties, despite the fact that contemporary decision theory has weakened its basic assumptions to the point where it teeters constantly on the brink of vacuity.


1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-926 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bacon

Predicate-functor logic, as founded by W. V. Quine ([1960], [1971], [1976], [1981]), is first-order predicate logic without individual variables. Instead, adverbs or predicate functors make explicit the permutations and replications of argument-places familiarly indicated by shifting variables about. For the history of this approach, see Quine [1971, 309ff.]. With the evaporation of variables, individual constants naturally assimilate to singleton predicates or adverbs, leaving no logical subjects whatever of type 0. The orphaned “predicates” may then be taken simply as terms in the sense of traditional logic: class and relational terms on model-theoretic semantics, schematic terms on Quine's denotational or truth-of semantics. Predicate-functor logic thus stands forth as the pre-eminent first-order term logic, as distinct from propositional-quantificational logic. By the same token, it might with some justification qualify as “first-order combinatory logic”, with allowance for some categorization of the sort eschewed in general combinatory logic, the ultimate term logic.Over the years, Quine has put forward various choices of primitive predicate functors for first-order logic with or without the full theory of identity. Moreover, he has provided translations of quantificational into predicate-functor notation and vice versa ([1971, 312f.], [1981, 651]). Such a translation does not of itself establish semantic completeness, however, in the absence of a proof that it preserves deducibility.An axiomatization of predicate-functor logic was first published by Kuhn [1980], using primitives rather like Quine's. As Kuhn noted, “The axioms and rules have been chosen to facilitate the completeness proof” [1980, 153]. While this expedient simplifies the proof, however, it limits the depth of analysis afforded by the axioms and rules. Mindful of this problem, Kuhn ([1981] and [1983]) boils his axiom system down considerably, correcting certain minor slips in the original paper.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
WOJCIECH DZIK ◽  
PIOTR WOJTYLAK

AbstractWe introduce unification in first-order logic. In propositional logic, unification was introduced by S. Ghilardi, see Ghilardi (1997, 1999, 2000). He successfully applied it in solving systematically the problem of admissibility of inference rules in intuitionistic and transitive modal propositional logics. Here we focus on superintuitionistic predicate logics and apply unification to some old and new problems: definability of disjunction and existential quantifier, disjunction and existential quantifier under implication, admissible rules, a basis for the passive rules, (almost) structural completeness, etc. For this aim we apply modified specific notions, introduced in propositional logic by Ghilardi, such as projective formulas, projective unifiers, etc.Unification in predicate logic seems to be harder than in the propositional case. Any definition of the key concept of substitution for predicate variables must take care of individual variables. We allow adding new free individual variables by substitutions (contrary to Pogorzelski & Prucnal (1975)). Moreover, since predicate logic is not as close to algebra as propositional logic, direct application of useful algebraic notions of finitely presented algebras, projective algebras, etc., is not possible.


1985 ◽  
Vol 14 (199) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gudmund Skovbjerg Frandsen

<p>Les Valiant has recently conceived a remarkable mathematical model of learnability. The originality appears through several facets of the model. Objects belonging to a specific concept are given a measure of naturalness in the form of a probability distribution. The learning of a concept takes place by means of a protocol that among other tools allows the use of a source of natural examples. A concept is learnable if a recognition algorithm can be synthesized within a polynomial number of steps. The recognition algorithm is allowed to be incorrect for an adjustable fraction of inputs measured with respect to naturalness.</p><p>Technically the model is based on the propositional logic over a finite number of Boolean variables. However, the underlying ideas are quite universal and can be realised by means of an almost arbitrary formal language, which we will demonstrate in this note. A single concept may include infinitely many objects within a formal language frame. Fortunately we can learn such concepts from finite sets of examples only. We shall prove a specific class of concepts to be learnable within the nontrivial formal language of predicate logic.</p>


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