scholarly journals On the Irrationality of Being in Two Minds

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahram Dehdashti ◽  
Lauren Fell ◽  
Peter Bruza
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Probability Theory ◽  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Decision Making Under Uncertainty ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Accessible Information ◽  
Human Decision

This article presents a general framework that allows irrational decision making to be theoretically investigated and simulated. Rationality in human decision making under uncertainty is normatively prescribed by the axioms of probability theory in order to maximize utility. However, substantial literature from psychology and cognitive science shows that human decisions regularly deviate from these axioms. Bistable probabilities are proposed as a principled and straight forward means for modeling (ir)rational decision making, which occurs when a decision maker is in “two minds”. We show that bistable probabilities can be formalized by positive-operator-valued projections in quantum mechanics. We found that (1) irrational decision making necessarily involves a wider spectrum of causal relationships than rational decision making, (2) the accessible information turns out to be greater in irrational decision making when compared to rational decision making, and (3) irrational decision making is quantum-like because it violates the Bell–Wigner polytope.

scholarly journals Thermodynamics as a theory of decision-making with information-processing costs

2013 ◽  
Vol 469 (2153) ◽  
pp. 20120683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro A. Ortega ◽  
Daniel A. Braun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Free Energy ◽  
Information Processing ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Statistical Physics ◽  
Variational Principles ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Human Decision

Perfectly rational decision-makers maximize expected utility, but crucially ignore the resource costs incurred when determining optimal actions. Here, we propose a thermodynamically inspired formalization of bounded rational decision-making where information processing is modelled as state changes in thermodynamic systems that can be quantified by differences in free energy. By optimizing a free energy, bounded rational decision-makers trade off expected utility gains and information-processing costs measured by the relative entropy. As a result, the bounded rational decision-making problem can be rephrased in terms of well-known variational principles from statistical physics. In the limit when computational costs are ignored, the maximum expected utility principle is recovered. We discuss links to existing decision-making frameworks and applications to human decision-making experiments that are at odds with expected utility theory. Since most of the mathematical machinery can be borrowed from statistical physics, the main contribution is to re-interpret the formalism of thermodynamic free-energy differences in terms of bounded rational decision-making and to discuss its relationship to human decision-making experiments.

The Interpersonal Sunk-Cost Effect

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 1072-1083 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Y. Olivola
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Sunk Costs ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Sunk Cost ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Social Closeness ◽  
Sunk Cost Effect ◽  
Human Tendency ◽  
Cost Effect

The sunk-cost fallacy—pursuing an inferior alternative merely because we have previously invested significant, but nonrecoverable, resources in it—represents a striking violation of rational decision making. Whereas theoretical accounts and empirical examinations of the sunk-cost effect have generally been based on the assumption that it is a purely intrapersonal phenomenon (i.e., solely driven by one’s own past investments), the present research demonstrates that it is also an interpersonal effect (i.e., people will alter their choices in response to other people’s past investments). Across eight experiments ( N = 6,076) covering diverse scenarios, I documented sunk-cost effects when the costs are borne by someone other than the decision maker. Moreover, the interpersonal sunk-cost effect is not moderated by social closeness or whether other people observe their sunk costs being “honored.” These findings uncover a previously undocumented bias, reveal that the sunk-cost effect is a much broader phenomenon than previously thought, and pose interesting challenges for existing accounts of this fascinating human tendency.

Resource-rational decision making

2021 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 15-21
Author(s):  
Rahul Bhui ◽  
Lucy Lai ◽  
Samuel J Gershman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making

Author reply: Empathy Does Provide Rational Support for Decisions. But Is It the Right Decision?

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fritz Breithaupt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Author Reply ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This article examines the relation of empathy and rational judgment. When people observe a conflict most are quick to side with one of the parties. Once a side has been taken, empathy with that party further solidifies this choice. Hence, it will be suggested that empathy is not neutral to judgment and rational decision-making. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will necessarily have made the best choice.

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