scholarly journals Price Competition and Setup Cost

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 289
Author(s):  
Rui Ota ◽  
Hiroshi Fujiu
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Product Market ◽  
New Product ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Setup Cost ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Setup Costs ◽  
Bertrand Price Competition

Few studies analyze the endogenous emergence of price competition in a new product market. This paper analyzes two differentiated products, an existing product and a newly introduced substitutable product, and investigates conditions under which a price competition endogenously emerges in a new product market in the context of a choice between engaging in price competition and holding price leadership. We demonstrate that Bertrand price competition emerges when the setup cost for the new product is high enough. This result implies that government policies reducing setup costs such as subsidies could change the type of competition to price leadership in a new product market.

scholarly journals Scanner Data: New Opportunities for Demand and Competitive Strategy Analysis

1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald W. Cotterill
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Scanner Data ◽  
Strategy Analysis ◽  
Price Response ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Sufficient Detail ◽  
Bertrand Price Competition ◽  
Reaction Equations

This paper reviews prior research by agricultural economists on the demand for food products using scanner data. Thereafter, a differentiated product's oligopoly model with Bertrand price competition is developed and used to specify brand level demand and oligopoly price reaction equations. The model has sufficient detail to estimate brand level price elasticities and price response elasticities which in turn can be used to estimate three indices of market power. The first index estimated is the familiar Rothschild Index. The paper develops estimates two new indexes, the observed index and the Chamberlin quotient for tacit collusion. It concludes with comments on how the proposed method for the measurement of market power in a differentiated oligopoly can be improved.

scholarly journals THE DYNAMICS OF BERTRAND PRICE COMPETITION WITH COST-REDUCING INVESTMENTS

2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 1681-1731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fedor Iskhakov ◽  
John Rust ◽  
Bertel Schjerning
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Bertrand Price Competition

Customer Value and New Product Retailing Dynamics

2010 ◽  
pp. 49-71
Author(s):  
Dr. Rajagopal
Keyword(s):  
Customer Value ◽  
Analytical Approach ◽  
New Products ◽  
Product Market ◽  
New Product ◽  
Product Performance ◽  
Use Value ◽  
Value Concept ◽  
Competitive Structure

The customer value concept is utilized to assess product performance and to determine the competitive structure of the new products. The analytical approach to the new product-market structuring based on customer value may be fitted well within the microeconomic framework. The measure of customer value as the product efficiency may be viewed from the customer’s perspective towards a ratio of outputs (e.g., perceived use value, resale value, reliability, safety, comfort) that customers obtain from a product relative to inputs (price, running costs) that customers have to deliver in exchange. The efficiency value derived can be understood as the return on the customer’s investment.

scholarly journals Capital Market Returns to New Product Development Success: Informational Effects on Product Market Advertising

2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyung M. Park ◽  
Pradeep K. Chintagunta ◽  
Inho Suk
Keyword(s):  
Product Development ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
New Product Development ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Product Market ◽  
New Product ◽  
Direct To Consumer ◽  
Direct To Consumer Advertising ◽  
The Capital Market

The authors aim to answer the following question: If the capital market reacts with abnormal stock returns to new product development success events, do these returns influence subsequent marketing decisions? Drawing on informational market feedback and managerial learning theories, the authors posit that when firms are uncertain about how responsive the product market will be to their marketing activities, signals received from the capital market help them update their beliefs about the product market’s responsiveness. In the pharmaceutical context, the authors decompose the abnormal returns at a new drug approval event into components that the firm can and cannot predict (i.e., predicted and unpredicted abnormal returns) and find that the postapproval advertising budget is larger when unpredicted abnormal approval returns are higher. Furthermore, this tendency is more pronounced for spending on detailing than for direct-to-consumer advertising. Consistent with these higher budgets, the authors find that postlaunch advertising is more effective when unpredicted abnormal approval returns are higher, particularly for detailing spending (vs. direct-to-consumer advertising). Overall, this study suggests that information flows from the capital market’s initial perceptions at new product introduction play an important role in subsequent marketing decisions in the product market.

scholarly journals Endogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Miguel A. Fonseca
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
High Frequency ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Asymmetric Costs ◽  
Simultaneous Move

This paper presents experimental evidence on the action commitment game with cost-asymmetric firms in a differentiated-products Bertrand duopoly. Unlike its quantity-setting counterpart, the risk-dominant leader–follower equilibrium Pareto dominates the simultaneous-move equilibrium. This equilibrium also minimizes payoff differences between firms. Hence, one would expect the model to accurately capture behavior. The evidence partially supports the theory: low-cost firms price in the first period more often than high-cost firms, and depending on the treatment, between 40 and 57 per cent of all observations conform to equilibrium play. However, the modal timing outcome involved both firms delaying their pricing decision. This timing outcome is characterized by Nash play and some collusion. The high frequency of delaying decisions could be due to a desire to reduce strategic uncertainty.

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