The Ethics of the Anselmian Being II (Respect)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
William Rowe

Prior formulations of the problem of evil, for example, by J. L. Mackie, William Rowe, and Paul Draper, assume that God must have requiring reasons to prevent evils to creatures, and use that assumption as the basis for claiming that the existence (or types, or amount, or distribution) of evils in this world is either incompatible with or gives strong prima facie evidence against the existence of God. But given that God’s reasons with respect to preventing evils are justifying, not requiring, reasons, no such arguments can get off the ground. This account, which is based on a first-order theory of divine ethics, differs from skeptical theism, which is based on moral epistemology. This difference makes the account developed here immune from the most serious criticisms that have made trouble for skeptical theism.

Global quantification in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-301
Author(s):  
John Mayberry
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Local Theory ◽  
Axiom Schema ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Naturally Occurring ◽  
Universe Of Sets

My aim here is to investigate the role of global quantifiers—quantifiers ranging over the entire universe of sets—in the formalization of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The use of such quantifiers in the formulas substituted into axiom schemata introduces, at least prima facie, a strong element of impredicativity into the thapry. The axiom schema of replacement provides an example of this. For each instance of that schema enlarges the very domain over which its own global quantifiers vary. The fundamental question at issue is this: How does the employment of these global quantifiers, and the choice of logical principles governing their use, affect the strengths of the axiom schemata in which they occur?I shall attack this question by comparing three quite different formalizations of the intuitive principles which constitute the Zermelo-Fraenkel system. The first of these, local Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (LZF), is formalized without using global quantifiers. The second, global Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (GZF), is the extension of the local theory obtained by introducing global quantifiers subject to intuitionistic logical laws, and taking the axiom schema of strong collection (Schema XII, §2) as an additional assumption of the theory. The third system is the conventional formalization of Zermelo-Fraenkel as a classical, first order theory. The local theory, LZF, is already very strong, indeed strong enough to formalize any naturally occurring mathematical argument. I have argued (in [3]) that it is the natural formalization of naive set theory. My intention, therefore, is to use it as a standard against which to measure the strength of each of the other two systems.

scholarly journals The Problem of Evil, Skeptical Theism and Moral Epistemology

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Scott M. Coley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely the reasons that STS doesn’t succumb to Sterba’s critique, STS threatens to undermine moral knowledge altogether.

scholarly journals Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 3-14
Author(s):  
Vince R. Vitale
Keyword(s):  
Specific Problem ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Technical Term ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Horrendous Evils ◽  
Horrendous Evil

This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible or unlikely). First horrendous evil is defined as a technical term. Then, after proposing conditions for successful theodicy, prima facie reasons are given for why two of the most popular approaches to theodicy—a greater goods approach and a blame-shifting approach—are not successful where horrendous evils are concerned. The chapter ends by outlining the rest of the book.

The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.

Anti-theodicy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. N. Trakakis
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Model ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Alternative Models ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Methodological Considerations

First, the nature of ‘anti-theodicy’ is outlined, and some indication is provided as to how this position differs from both theodicy and skeptical theism, and how the anti-theodicy view can be supported on the basis of moral and methodological considerations. Secondly, a possible metaphysical basis for anti-theodicy is sought, and this is achieved by abandoning anthropomorphic conceptions of God in favour of alternative models of divinity that might make possible new and more fruitful perspectives on the problem of evil. The alternative model advanced here for special attention is the Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley. The chapter concludes by showing how the problem of evil can be answered from a Bradleian perspective.

scholarly journals A first-order theory of Ulm type

Computability ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 347-358
Author(s):  
Matthew Harrison-Trainor
Keyword(s):  
Order Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory

scholarly journals Quasi-decidability of a Fragment of the First-Order Theory of Real Numbers

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Franek ◽  
Stefan Ratschan ◽  
Piotr Zgliczynski
Keyword(s):  
Order Theory ◽  
Real Numbers ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory
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