scholarly journals Connecting Consciousness to Physical Causality: Abhinavagupta’s Phenomenology of Subjectivity and Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory

Religions ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Loriliai Biernacki
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Physical Causality ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

scholarly journals Awareness and integrated information theory identify plant meristems as sites of conscious activity

PROTOPLASMA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Trewavas
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Complex Networks ◽  
Environmental Changes ◽  
Biological Function ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Extrinsic Information ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Conscious Activity ◽  
Integrated Information

AbstractLacking an anatomical brain/nervous system, it is assumed plants are not conscious. The biological function of consciousness is an input to behaviour; it is adaptive (subject to selection) and based on information. Complex language makes human consciousness unique. Consciousness is equated to awareness. All organisms are aware of their surroundings, modifying their behaviour to improve survival. Awareness requires assessment too. The mechanisms of animal assessment are neural while molecular and electrical in plants. Awareness of plants being also consciousness may resolve controversy. The integrated information theory (IIT), a leading theory of consciousness, is also blind to brains, nerves and synapses. The integrated information theory indicates plant awareness involves information of two kinds: (1) communicative, extrinsic information as a result of the perception of environmental changes and (2) integrated intrinsic information located in the shoot and root meristems and possibly cambium. The combination of information constructs an information nexus in the meristems leading to assessment and behaviour. The interpretation of integrated information in meristems probably involves the complex networks built around [Ca2+]i that also enable plant learning, memory and intelligent activities. A mature plant contains a large number of conjoined, conscious or aware, meristems possibly unique in the living kingdom.

scholarly journals The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. e1004286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Cerullo
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

scholarly journals Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?

Erkenntnis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 84 (5) ◽  
pp. 1065-1085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hedda Hassel Mørch
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

How to Catch an AI Zombie

2020 ◽  
pp. 439-458
Author(s):  
Susan Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Real World ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Artificial Consciousness ◽  
High Level ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

How can we determine if AI is conscious? The chapter begins by illustrating that there are potentially very serious real-world costs to getting facts about AI consciousness wrong. It then proposes a provisional framework for investigating artificial consciousness that involves several tests or markers. One test is the AI Consciousness Test, which challenges an AI with a series of increasingly demanding natural-language interactions. Another test is based on the Integrated Information Theory, developed by Giulio Tononi and others, and considers whether a machine has a high level of “integrated information.” A third test is a Chip Test, where speculatively an individual’s brain is gradually replaced with durable microchips. If this individual being tested continues to report having phenomenal consciousness, the chapter argues that this could be a reason to believe that some machines could have consciousness.

Integrated Information Theory, Searle, and the Arbitrariness Question

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 629-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis Fallon
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

scholarly journals Integrated Information Theory and Isomorphic Feed-Forward Philosophical Zombies

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (11) ◽  
pp. 1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake R. Hanson ◽  
Sara I. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Original System ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Mathematical Framework ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Labeling Scheme ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

Any theory amenable to scientific inquiry must have testable consequences. This minimal criterion is uniquely challenging for the study of consciousness, as we do not know if it is possible to confirm via observation from the outside whether or not a physical system knows what it feels like to have an inside—a challenge referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. To arrive at a theory of consciousness, the hard problem has motivated development of phenomenological approaches that adopt assumptions of what properties consciousness has based on first-hand experience and, from these, derive the physical processes that give rise to these properties. A leading theory adopting this approach is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which assumes our subjective experience is a “unified whole”, subsequently yielding a requirement for physical feedback as a necessary condition for consciousness. Here, we develop a mathematical framework to assess the validity of this assumption by testing it in the context of isomorphic physical systems with and without feedback. The isomorphism allows us to isolate changes in Φ without affecting the size or functionality of the original system. Indeed, the only mathematical difference between a “conscious” system with Φ > 0 and an isomorphic “philosophical zombie” with Φ = 0 is a permutation of the binary labels used to internally represent functional states. This implies Φ is sensitive to functionally arbitrary aspects of a particular labeling scheme, with no clear justification in terms of phenomenological differences. In light of this, we argue any quantitative theory of consciousness, including IIT, should be invariant under isomorphisms if it is to avoid the existence of isomorphic philosophical zombies and the epistemological problems they pose.

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