scholarly journals Distributing Responsibilities for Climate Adaptation: Examples from the Water Domain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 3676
Author(s):  
Neelke Doorn ◽  
Lieke Brackel ◽  
Sara Vermeulen

It is often assumed that climate adaptation policy asks for new responsibility arrangements between central government and citizens, with citizens getting a more prominent role. This prompts the question under which conditions these new responsibility arrangements can be justified as they may raise serious ethical concerns. Without paying due attention to these ethical concerns, climate adaptation policy may be unsuccessful and even be considered illegitimate. This paper aims to address this topic by exploring some examples of climate adaptation responses and their associated ethical challenges. The examples from the water domain differ in terms of their primary beneficiaries and the extent to which they are prone to collective action problems. Discussion of the examples shows that any shift of responsibilities towards citizens should be accompanied by a governmental responsibility to make sure that citizens are indeed able to assume these responsibilities and a responsibility to see to it that the greater involvement of responsibilities does not create disproportional inequalities.

2021 ◽  
Vol 167 (3-4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lubell ◽  
Mark Stacey ◽  
Michelle A. Hummel

AbstractThis paper translates Ostrom’s “diagnostic approach” for social-ecological systems to identify the collective action problems and core governance barriers for sea-level rise adaptation in the San Francisco Bay Area. The diagnostic approach considers variables related to the resource system, the resource units, the users, and the governance system. Coupled ecological-infrastructure models identify two core collective action problems: vulnerability interdependency and adaptation interdependency. Qualitative social science case study methods identify the key structural governance and behavioral barriers to cooperation and ongoing activities to address them. The diagnostic approach is potentially applicable to any coastal regions that are vulnerable to sea-level rise and also other climate adaptation issues where vulnerability and adaptation interdependencies require overcoming governance challenges to collective action.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Zheng ◽  
Regina Abrami

Why have China's petrochemical and steel industries behaved so differently in seeking trade protection through antidumping measures, especially given that both industries face the full force of the global economy? We argue that the patterning of antidumping actions is best explained in terms of industrial structures, inclusive of degrees of horizontal concentration and vertical integration. These structures determine a firm's motivation to seek protection as well as its capacity to overcome collective action problems within its industry. In the petrochemical industry, the shift toward greater horizontal consolidation and vertical integration reduces the collective action problems associated with antidumping petitions among upstream companies. It also weakens downstream companies lobbying in favor of the general protection of highly integrated conglomerates. In the steel industry, by contrast, national industrial policy fails to weaken local state interests sufficiently. Fragmented upstream and downstream channels instead persist, with strong odds against upstream suppliers waging a successful defense of material interests. Such distinctive industrial structures, we show, were a direct result of whether the central government could restructure these designated priority industries in its preferred direction. We find that exogenous price shocks proved particularly helpful in this regard.


Author(s):  
Patrick Emmenegger

AbstractInstitutionalism gives priority to structure over agency. Yet institutions have never developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups. This paper develops a conceptual framework for the role of agency in historical institutionalism. Based on recent contributions following the coalitional turn and drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, it argues that agency plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of social coalitions that stabilize but also challenge institutions. Without such agency, no coalition can be created, maintained, or changed. Similarly, without a supporting coalition, no contested institution can survive. Yet, due to collective action problems, such coalitional work is challenging. This coalitional perspective offers a robust role for agency in historical institutionalism, but it also explains why institutions remain stable despite agency. In addition, this paper forwards several portable propositions that allow for the identification of who is likely to develop agency and what these actors do.


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