scholarly journals The introduction of the moral psychology in the ergon argument

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-391
Author(s):  
Angelo Antonio Pires de Oliveira

In this paper, I discuss in detail one of the first conclusions drawn by Aristotle in the ergon argument. The paper provides an in-depth approach to Nicomachean Ethics’ lines 1098a3-4, where one reads: “λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος”. I divide the discussion into two parts. In the first part, I put under scrutiny how one should take the word “πρακτική” and argue that one should avoid taking this word as meaning “practical” in the passage. I will argue in favor of taking it as meaning “active”. The exegetical inconvenience of taking “πρακτική” as meaning “practical” is the fact that it restricts the results achieved in the ergon argument by excluding the possibility of contemplation being considered a eudaimon life. In the second part, I discuss the expression “λόγον ἔχον” and provide some arguments to take it as preliminarily introducing the criterion of division of the virtues that will be spelled out in EN I.13 so that the λόγον-ἔχον part of the soul here also makes reference to the virtue of the non-rational part, i.e., virtue of character. I offer a deflationary view by showing that the moral psychology is developed in EN I.7 within the limits imposed by the ergon argument.

Phronesis ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Di Muzio

AbstractContrary to what most interpreters hold, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is not committed to the view that people of established vicious character could never become good. The present paper proves this result (1) by giving a better reading of 1114 a 12-21, a passage which has traditionally been taken to assert that unjust and self-indulgent people are doomed to a lifetime of vice; (2) by showing that when Aristotle refers to self-indulgent people as "incurable", he does not mean that they could never change, but only that they could not change as a result of external influences such as persuasion or punishment; (3) by proving that although Aristotle regards the desires of vicious people as determined by their character, there is room within Aristotelian moral psychology for the possibility that people of corrupt character become motivated to begin a process of moral reform.


Author(s):  
Dominic Scott

Focusing on Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, this book compares their views on the persuasiveness of moral argument: how far did they think it could reach beyond a narrow circle of believers and influence people more generally? Answering this question requires a wide–ranging approach, which examines their views on such topics as rationality, moral psychology, rhetoric, education, and gender. The first part of the book shows that for Plato certain kinds of argument are beyond the reach of most people, specifically arguments that make appeal to transcendent Forms. But he still thought that there is another level of argument, restricted to human psychology and politics, which could have a much wider appeal, especially if supplemented by the appropriate rhetoric. The second half of the book turns to the Nicomachean Ethics to determine Aristotle’s views about the reach of moral argument, as well as its purposes. He is certainly very restrictive when it comes to the kinds of argument pursued in the work itself, proposing to talk only to those who are mature in years and well brought up. Like Plato, however, he also allows for the possibility of another type of discourse, which is more rhetorical in nature and could benefit those who are less mature. Though mainly focused on the Republic and Nicomachean Ethics, this book also examines relevant passages from Plato’s Laws and Aristotle’s Politics.


Author(s):  
Hendrik Lorenz

The present paper focuses on Aristotle’s claim in the Eudemian Ethics that the virtues of character are ‘states to do with decision’, by which he means that they are somehow responsible for decisions. In the paper’s first two sections, I explicate the way in which he thinks the character-virtues contribute to the correctness of the virtuous person’s decisions. In two subsequent sections, I articulate two philosophical objections to the picture that will have emerged. I defend Aristotle against the first objection. In articulating the second objection, I rely on texts from the Nicomachean Ethics and the De motu animalium that John Cooper’s work on Aristotle’s moral psychology has greatly illuminated. I argue that the second objection cannot be answered in a satisfactory way, and that it identifies a philosophical weakness in the moral psychology of the Eudemian Ethics, namely that it operates with an overly restrictive conception of practical reason.


Author(s):  
Dominic Scott

Focusing on Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, this book compares their views on the persuasiveness of moral argument: how far did they think it could reach beyond a narrow circle of believers and influence people more generally? Answering this question requires a wide-ranging approach, which examines their views on such topics as rationality, moral psychology, rhetoric, education, and gender. The first part of the book shows that for Plato certain kinds of argument are beyond the reach of most people, specifically arguments that make appeal to transcendent Forms. But he still thought that there is another level of argument, restricted to human psychology and politics, which could have a much wider appeal, especially if supplemented by the appropriate rhetoric. The second half of the book turns to the Nicomachean Ethics to determine Aristotle’s views about the reach of moral argument, as well as its purposes. He is certainly very restrictive when it comes to the kinds of argument pursued in the work itself, proposing to talk only to those who are mature in years and well brought up. Like Plato, however, he also allows for the possibility of another type of discourse, which is more rhetorical in nature and could benefit those who are less mature. Though mainly focused on the Republic and Nicomachean Ethics, this book also examines relevant passages from Plato’s Laws and Aristotle’s Politics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross A. Thompson

Abstract Tomasello's moral psychology of obligation would be developmentally deepened by greater attention to early experiences of cooperation and shared social agency between parents and infants, evolved to promote infant survival. They provide a foundation for developing understanding of the mutual obligations of close relationships that contribute (alongside peer experiences) to growing collaborative skills, fairness expectations, and fidelity to social norms.


Author(s):  
Thomas C. Brickhouse ◽  
Nicholas D. Smith
Keyword(s):  

1995 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Day ◽  
Mark B. Tappan
Keyword(s):  

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