How Our Minds Are Made Up

This chapter argues that epistemic dependence is a routine and rational part of ordinary life. It focuses on implicit deference, in particular deferring to others to learn what we should, or even already do, believe. Using the example of “never Trumpers”—Republicans who abjured Donald Trump but often came to embrace him—it argues that our belief representations are surprisingly fragile, because we rely on others and on the world to tell us what we believe. In this light, it argues, we should be less concerned than is sometimes thought by ordinary people’s ignorance about important questions: what matters is not whether they know, but whether they know how to find out.

Plato on Divinization and the Divinity of the Rational Part of the Soul

Three distinct reasons that Plato calls the rational part of the soul “divine” are analyzed: (1) its metaphysical kinship with the Forms, (2) its epistemological ability to know the Forms, and (3) its ethical capacity to live by them. Supposing these three divine aspects of the rational part are unified in the life of each person, they naturally suggest a process of divinization or “becoming like god” according to which a person (specifically, a philosopher), by (3) living more virtuously, which requires (2) increasingly better knowledge of the Forms, gradually (1) becomes united with them. This process of divinization is in fact found throughout the middle and late dialogues, including the Phaedo, Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus, Timaeus, and the Laws. This synoptic view of the Platonic idea(l) of divinization provides a standard according to which misplaced emphasis, flaws, and tension created by other interpretations are criticized and corrected.

The introduction of the moral psychology in the ergon argument

In this paper, I discuss in detail one of the first conclusions drawn by Aristotle in the ergon argument. The paper provides an in-depth approach to Nicomachean Ethics’ lines 1098a3-4, where one reads: “λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος”. I divide the discussion into two parts. In the first part, I put under scrutiny how one should take the word “πρακτική” and argue that one should avoid taking this word as meaning “practical” in the passage. I will argue in favor of taking it as meaning “active”. The exegetical inconvenience of taking “πρακτική” as meaning “practical” is the fact that it restricts the results achieved in the ergon argument by excluding the possibility of contemplation being considered a eudaimon life. In the second part, I discuss the expression “λόγον ἔχον” and provide some arguments to take it as preliminarily introducing the criterion of division of the virtues that will be spelled out in EN I.13 so that the λόγον-ἔχον part of the soul here also makes reference to the virtue of the non-rational part, i.e., virtue of character. I offer a deflationary view by showing that the moral psychology is developed in EN I.7 within the limits imposed by the ergon argument.

Aristotle

Aristotle agrees with Plato that virtue requires the cooperation of the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul, and that the virtuous person is always better off than the non-virtuous, even though virtue alone is not sufficient for happiness. To strengthen Plato’s argument for this claim, he offers a more detailed account of the nature of happiness, and of the relation between virtue and happiness. Since happiness is the supreme human good, it should be identified with rational activity in accordance with virtue in a complete life, in which external circumstances are favourable. A virtue of character is the appropriate agreement between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul, aiming at fine action (i.e., action that promotes the common good). This requirement of appropriate agreement distinguishes virtue from continence (mere control of the rational over the non-rational part). To show that a life of virtue, so defined, promotes the agent’s happiness, Aristotle argues that one’s own happiness requires the right kind of friendship with others, in which one aims at the good of others for their own sake.

Plato

Plato rejects Socrates’ belief that knowledge of the good is sufficient for being virtuous; he argues that human souls have a non-rational part (emotions, impulses), and that the virtues require not only knowledge, but also the correct training of the non-rational part. He rejects Socrates’ belief that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Instead he argues that the virtuous person is always happier than anyone else. He defends this view in the most difficult case, the other-regarding virtue of justice. Plato recognizes that one may plausibly argue that my justice is good for other people, but harmful to me. None the less he rejects this argument. The appropriate relation between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul promotes both the agent’s good and the good of others; that is why the just person is happier than anyone else. Those who suppose that the just person may be worse off by being just do not understand the character of the human good.

Aquinas

Aquinas develops Aristotelian themes as a foundation for his account of the Christian virtues. The will is both rational, being directed towards the ultimate good, and free, being determined by practical reason about what contributes to the ultimate good. Virtue is the good use of free will; it requires both the appropriate training of the passions (the non-rational part of the soul) and the correct practical reason. Practical reason finds the first principles of the natural law (the rational principles that are suitable for human nature), and the action-guiding rules that specify the implications of the natural law for human beings with a social nature, and for human society. The virtues, embodying the natural law, guide us towards the good that is proper to human beings. They do not guide us all the way, because we are subject to the influence of the sins that turn us away from God. Divine grace moves our free will to overcome the effects of these sins, and to form the Christian virtues that lead us towards the complete good.

Comenius' man in the context of internal and external freedom towards physical, intellectual and emotional spheres

Is comeniology a science? This question becomes the guiding thought of my contem-plations. I conduct the analysis of John A. Comenius's concept according to the selected scientific criteria: logical order, levels of theory, explanatory power, heuristic power, degree of persuasion and degree of justification, power of prediction, language and methods. I accept the image of a man as a triad involving spirit (immortal part connected with the spiritual world), soul (rational part considering the free will given by the Creator) and body (animal part and the part of the soul capable of perceiving sensory stimuli). In my article I am searching for a proper in-terpretation of Comenius' concept of a free man that was based on observation and experience.

Aristotle on Virtue of Character and the Authority of Reason

I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē.

HEAD-FAKE: TWO JOKES IN LUCRETIUS 3.136–50

Towards the beginning of Book 3, Lucretius starts his description of the soul. According to Epicurus, the soul is divided into two, an irrational part, which is coextensive with the body, and a rational part, the ‘mind’, which is located in the chest. This position is a relic from an earlier, non–philosophical tradition, and was adopted by several different philosophers. But Alexandrian doctors would soon correctly locate the mind in the head, and later Epicureans would have to defend an increasingly uncomfortable and out-of-date position.