North Korea’s Purge of pro-Japanese group, Viewed in the Report of Prisoners of war during the Korean War

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 125-161
Author(s):  
Sang-Ho LEE
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (10-3) ◽  
pp. 274-287

The paper highlights the consultation process of Soviet-Chinese-North Korean leaders on the ceasefire issue during the Korean War and their respective positions. The author stresses that the Armistice Agreement, signed in July 1953, was in response to the demands of the Soviet leadership to rush to end the war with Stalin’s death, rather than reflecting the wishes of the communists. The forced repatriation of the prisoners of war demanded by the communists was also frustrated and the war was a tie that almost returned to its pre-war state.


Author(s):  
Sahr Conway-Lanz

The Korean War demonstrated the serious problems that the United States had adhering to the new 1949 Geneva Conventions and the severely limited protections that these new treaties provided. The protections for war victims were undermined both by serious gaps in the treaties that failed to provide much safety from bombing to civilians and by US deviations from the agreements in the handling of refugees and prisoners of war. However, Americans did not discard the agreements in the wake of their troubled Korean War experiences. Instead, the war helped to legitimize and lay the foundation for the further internalization of the new laws through their formal implementation, the public controversy they generated, and a boomerang effect of atrocity accusations. Despite failing to provide much protection for Korean War victims, the treaties were part of a broader international consensus-building process that helped to spread humanitarian norms.


This chapter considers the long-term and global impact of the Korean War. It suggests that telling the story of the Korean War through the interrogation room puts into stark relief the productive capabilities of war, not simply its destructive ones. What the prisoners of war and interrogators understood intimately was that states used warfare not simply as political strategy but also as a form of governance. The violence enacted by militaries on the battlefields, through mass air bombings and via torture in the interrogation rooms, must be viewed through a larger, implicating lens, where these acts are not simply rendered as “immoral,” “evil,” or “irrational.”


2002 ◽  
Vol 167 (11) ◽  
pp. 898-903 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elspeth Cameron Ritchie

1962 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-385
Author(s):  
Robert Waelder

It was a great shock to the American public to learn that during the Korean War some American prisoners had co-operated with their captors. It was obvious that they had acted under pressure, and it came as a surprise both that helpless prisoners had been subjected to such pressures and that Americans had yielded to them. It had long been taken for granted that prisoners of war would be treated according to the gentleman's code (except, possibly, for isolated outrages). It was overlooked that modern totalitarianism had never recognized the gentleman's code but had denounced it as a fraud, meant to facilitate the exploitation of the masses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-257
Author(s):  
Jung Byung Joon

Abstract Under the terms of the Korean War armistice, prisoners of war (pow s) could reject repatriation. The vast majority of non-repatriates went to either of the Koreas, China, or Taiwan. But a small group consisting of 76 Korean and twelve Chinese pow s exercised their option to go to neutral nations instead. This article examines how South Korean discourse about these outlier pow s shifted over the decades. An early assumption was that they had made a principled, ideological decision to reject both blocs of a global Cold War. But their choice of neutral countries was a more personal than ideological one. Their anti-communism appeared muted, since they also eschewed the other side. This interpretation contained little direct knowledge of the pow s themselves; it owed more to how the South Korean public saw the war that devastated their peninsula. There also was the influence of “The Square” in the Korean intellectual society and the mass media in their understanding of these Korean prisoners. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, South Koreans became more confident about the rivalry with North Korea. This led to a reengagement with the memory of the pow s who had spurned both Koreas, making rejection of Communist North Korea more convincing and their refusal to remain in South Korea was less problematic.


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