The ambassador of Spain to the Russian Empire Anibal Morillo y Pérez del Villar and his “Memories”

The article examines the memoirs of a Spanish diplomat Anibal Morillo and Perez del Villar, the Count of Cartagena. He held the post of the Spanish ambassador in the Russian Empire in 1914-1916 when World War One broke out. “Memories of my Embassy in Russia” by Morillo is a specific source that shows the life of the zarist court and diplomatic circles of St. Petersburg in that period. The Count of Cartagena’s activity has not been considered much in Russian historiography. Based on the analysis of his memoirs, the author of the article suggests that Morillo considered the Russian revolution to be brought in from outside. A study of the memoirs showed that the Spanish ambassador at St. Petersburg preferred German diplomacy and had a peculiar notion of the role of Russia in unleashing the war. The author of this article concludes that Morillo’s ideas were partly shaped by the internal problems and the international situation of his own country at the beginning of the 20th century and that the Spanish ambassador was one of the Spanish Germanophiles. Spain maintained strict neutrality throughout the war. The Spanish embassy in Russia carried out important humanitarian mission and active mediation activities, supporting Russian citizens on enemy territory and trying to improve the situation of Russian prisoners of war and facilitate their return. The issue of the personal participation of Anibal Morillo in mediation is also touched upon in this article.

Activities of the NKVD of the Far East in the fight against crime in the second half of 1945

This article examines the causes and conditions of the aggravation of the criminal situation in the Far East in the second half of 1945 and the historical experience of local NKVD (Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs) bodies in maintaining law and order under the conditions of the Soviet-Japanese war and the first post-war period. Based on the analysis of the documentation of the NKVD departments of Primorye and Khabarovsk territories, including internal administrative documents (orders, plans, etc.), as well as materials of primary party organizations (minutes of party meetings, certificates, memos, etc.), the author draws conclusions about the development of the criminal situation in the region, and discusses the NKVDs ways and directions to ensure law and order. Studying the stated problems, it was possible not only to state the presence of negative dynamics in the number and severity of criminal manifestations, but also to establish that the criminal crisis of the second half of 1945 was caused by the imposition of new socio-economic and political factors (including the amnesty for prisoners, the relocation of large masses of troops, the Soviet-Japanese war, the placement of prisoners of war, demobilization) on the already difficult criminal situation that had developed during the Great Patriotic War. The study largely confirmed the fact repeatedly noted in historiography about the impact of personnel starvation and problems of material support on the effectiveness of the NKVD in the war and post-war period. The archival documents show that the main ways to normalize the operational situation in the Far East region were measures concerning organizational work and operational-search activities, as well as control-methodical and administrative measures. The author concludes that the measures taken allowed the NKVD of the Far East to reverse the explosive growth of serious street crime by the end of 1945. However, this success was only partial - the overall level of criminal activity in the region continued to remain at a fairly high level for several post-war years.

Organization of pedestrian crossings of Soviet repatriates to the western border of the USSR (1944–1945)

The article analyzes the work of the Office of the Commissioner of the SNK of the USSR for the repatriation of Soviet citizens, Military councils, headquarters of fronts and armies for the return of Soviet displaced persons on foot in 1944–1945. The central place in the publication is occupied by the analysis of the organization of the mechanism of pedestrian crossings of released Soviet prisoners of war and civilian displaced persons to the western border of the USSR. Special attention is focused on the decisions taken by the repatriation and military departments – the Office of the Commissioner of the SNK of the USSR for repatriation, Military councils, headquarters of fronts and armies on the organization of pedestrian crossings of Soviet repatriates.

Problem jeńców radzieckich w czasie II wojny światowej w pamięci i polityce historycznej ZSRR i Federacji Rosyjskiej

This article deals with the problem of the presence of Soviet prisoners of war during World War II in the memory and politics of memory of the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia. It describes the most important stages of the attitude towards prisoners of war in different historical periods, including in: the Stalinist regime, when they were condemned; the Khrushchev Thaw, when they were rehabilitated; after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the prisoner-of-war issues appeared in historical debate and culture; and in modern times, when prisoners of war have been pushed to the margins of the politics of memory and memory as an inconvenient problem from the point of view of the current glorification of Stalin and his era.

Italian military internees in Stalag-352 Nazi camp in Masjukowshchyna (1943–1944)

The article analyses the Belarusian and foreign historiography of the problem of finding Italian internees in Masjukowshchyna in 1943–1944. The authors introduce new information into scientific circulation, relying on the personal archive of E. Bordignon, whose own grandfather was in Stalag-352 as a prisoner. The living conditions of the Italian prisoners of war are considered, as well as information about their further fate on the example of Domenico Arzani.

Non-Combatant Immunity and 'Just War'

<p>Moral philosophers and the international political community alike have traditionally valued the lives of civilians over those of soldiers. The first part of jus in bello, the doctrine which aims to characterise the just conduct of war, states that 'civilians, as non-combatants, must not be attacked or killed', whereas the only requirement concerning the killing of soldiers is that any attack must meet the requirement of proportionality: it must not cause so much harm that the good it does is overridden. Similarly, Article 51 of the Geneva Protocols states that 'the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations', and that 'the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack'. The requirement of proportionality is mentioned only with reference to the protection of civilian life or cultural objects, except in the general statement that 'it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.' The specific protections offered to combatants are limited to wounded, sick or shipwrecked combatants, and prisoners of war - those combatants who most closely resemble civilians. The Protocols do state that all attacks must be limited to 'military objectives', but the definition of these objectives is permissive, to say the least: 'Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.' To kill enemy soldiers in large numbers surely offers a definite military advantage. This thesis examines the moral basis for the distinction that these laws and doctrines draw between soldiers and civilians. I explain why the distinction between combatant and non-combatant casualties is not, in a significant proportion of cases, a morally sound one. I argue that any moral justification of the principle of non-combatant immunity must be of a utilitarian nature, pointing to its ability to limit the overall carnage of warfare. The implications for jus in bello of recognising that the principle can be justified only on these grounds are wide-ranging and important. If we want to retain civilian immunity, we must accept a utilitarian simulacrum of that doctrine. I argue that applying utilitarian standards to the just conduct of war will lead us to prefer very different sorts of policies from those currently embodied by jus in bello. Thus what we think about civilian immunity may have consequences for what we think about the moral foundation of our doctrine of just war.</p>

Non-Combatant Immunity and 'Just War'

<p>Moral philosophers and the international political community alike have traditionally valued the lives of civilians over those of soldiers. The first part of jus in bello, the doctrine which aims to characterise the just conduct of war, states that 'civilians, as non-combatants, must not be attacked or killed', whereas the only requirement concerning the killing of soldiers is that any attack must meet the requirement of proportionality: it must not cause so much harm that the good it does is overridden. Similarly, Article 51 of the Geneva Protocols states that 'the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations', and that 'the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack'. The requirement of proportionality is mentioned only with reference to the protection of civilian life or cultural objects, except in the general statement that 'it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.' The specific protections offered to combatants are limited to wounded, sick or shipwrecked combatants, and prisoners of war - those combatants who most closely resemble civilians. The Protocols do state that all attacks must be limited to 'military objectives', but the definition of these objectives is permissive, to say the least: 'Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.' To kill enemy soldiers in large numbers surely offers a definite military advantage. This thesis examines the moral basis for the distinction that these laws and doctrines draw between soldiers and civilians. I explain why the distinction between combatant and non-combatant casualties is not, in a significant proportion of cases, a morally sound one. I argue that any moral justification of the principle of non-combatant immunity must be of a utilitarian nature, pointing to its ability to limit the overall carnage of warfare. The implications for jus in bello of recognising that the principle can be justified only on these grounds are wide-ranging and important. If we want to retain civilian immunity, we must accept a utilitarian simulacrum of that doctrine. I argue that applying utilitarian standards to the just conduct of war will lead us to prefer very different sorts of policies from those currently embodied by jus in bello. Thus what we think about civilian immunity may have consequences for what we think about the moral foundation of our doctrine of just war.</p>