Soviet-Chinese-North Korean consultations on armistice during the Korean War

The paper highlights the consultation process of Soviet-Chinese-North Korean leaders on the ceasefire issue during the Korean War and their respective positions. The author stresses that the Armistice Agreement, signed in July 1953, was in response to the demands of the Soviet leadership to rush to end the war with Stalin’s death, rather than reflecting the wishes of the communists. The forced repatriation of the prisoners of war demanded by the communists was also frustrated and the war was a tie that almost returned to its pre-war state.

When does war end? Armistice and the Prize Courts of the twentieth century

This article uses prize law to examine the end of war in the twentieth century. The Armistice agreement that concluded the First World War enshrined the victor’s right to seize enemy merchant ships after the cessation of military hostilities, shifting the legal understanding of a hostile act. This disconnection turned prize into a strategic tool for victors to use over belligerents. This appeared again in the Second World War, when prize courts condoned the taking of prize after Germany’s surrender. Egypt used prize law as a strategic tool to continue its prohibition against Israel’s use of the Suez Canal. The article concludes prize-taking in the twentieth century was not just a historical curiosity, but a strategic imperative for victors.

Soviet-German Conflict over Finland1941-1945

Soviet-German Conflict over Finland 1941-1944 is another phase of challenges that faced Finland to keep it's independence and sovereignty.It started as a result of German Barbarossa against Soviet Union in June 22nd,1941 and lasted for four years,when ended by armistice agreement signed in September 19th,1944.As what happened in the previous winter war,Finland lost many territories in her southern border,paid war indemnity of 300 million american dollar to Soviet Union,and the most important, it kept Finland behave wisely and peacefully along the next years.

“Complacency or Complicity?: Reconsidering the un Command’s Role in Syngman Rhee’s Release of North Korean pows”

Under cover of night, on 18 June 1953, South Korean President Syngman Rhee released nearly 25,000 “non-repatriate” North Korean prisoners of war (pows). The event occurred just as United Nations Command (unc), Chinese, and North Korean negotiators were preparing to sign a hard-fought armistice agreement at P’anmunjŏm that long had been delayed on the question of voluntary repatriation of pows. unc officials articulated an enduring tale of surprise and betrayal, one that persists in Korean War histories to this day. However, this article, after an examination of unc pow camp records, is able to look beyond their outrage to discover that the u.s. Army, in fact, formulated a deliberate strategy of restraint for a likely prisoner release. This plan grew out of unc Commander General Mark W. Clark’s sympathy for anti-Communist pows and a sense of anxiety regarding the future of u.s. relations with the Republic of Korea (rok). Although no evidence exists to support a claim that u.s. officials formally colluded with the rok government, the u.s. military played a complicit role in Rhee’s pow release.