scholarly journals Risk Sharing, Macro-Prudential Policy and Welfare in an Overlapping Generations Model (OLG) Economy

2021 ◽  
Vol XXIV (Issue 4B) ◽  
pp. 585-611
Author(s):  
Amira Hakim ◽  
Eleftherios Thalassinos
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Prudential Policy

scholarly journals INCOME INEQUALITY, MOBILITY, AND THE WELFARE STATE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1198-1226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bossi ◽  
Gulcin Gumus
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Public Programs ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Welfare State

In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping-generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.

scholarly journals Endogenous Agency Problems and the Dynamics of Rents

2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2542-2567
Author(s):  
B Biais ◽  
A Landier
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Complex Tasks ◽  
Complex Skills ◽  
Do So

Abstract While potentially more productive, more complex tasks generate larger agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old agents, however, are imperfect substitutes for young ones, because the latter are easier to incentivize, thanks to longer horizons. This reduces competition between generations, enabling young managers to go for larger complexity than their predecessors. Consequently, equilibrium complexity and rents gradually increase beyond what is optimal for the principal and for society.

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