Overlapping-Generations Model and the Optimal Household Saving Rule in China

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin C. Chua
2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chadwick C. Curtis ◽  
Steven Lugauer ◽  
Nelson C. Mark

This paper studies how demographic variation affects the aggregate household saving rate. We focus on China because it is experiencing an historic demographic transition and has had a massive increase in household saving. We conduct a quantitative investigation using a structural overlapping generations model that incorporates parental care through support for dependent children and financial transfers to retirees. The saving decisions in the parameterized model mimic many of the features observed in the Chinese household saving rate time series from 1955 to 2009. Demographic change alone accounts for over half of the saving rate increase. (JEL D12, D91, E21, J11, O12, O16, P36)


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1198-1226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bossi ◽  
Gulcin Gumus

In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping-generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2542-2567
Author(s):  
B Biais ◽  
A Landier

Abstract While potentially more productive, more complex tasks generate larger agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old agents, however, are imperfect substitutes for young ones, because the latter are easier to incentivize, thanks to longer horizons. This reduces competition between generations, enabling young managers to go for larger complexity than their predecessors. Consequently, equilibrium complexity and rents gradually increase beyond what is optimal for the principal and for society.


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