scholarly journals A Realistic Lightweight PUF-based Mutual Authentication in RFID Environments

Author(s):  
E Haodudin Nurkifli

This research proposes a realistic mutual authentication protocol using non-ideal PUF in an RFID environment. Initially, we evaluate and show the weaknesses of two popular schemes, Gope et al.'s and Feng Zhu et al.'s schemes; based on our investigation, their schemes fail to achieve several security features and cannot withstand various attacks. Later, we propose a new scheme to resolve the problem their schemes and provide the solution for the RFID security problem generically. Analyzes informal and formal are used to ensure that our proposal fulfills security properties and withstands various attacks.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
E Haodudin Nurkifli

This research proposes a realistic mutual authentication protocol using non-ideal PUF in an RFID environment. Initially, we evaluate and show the weaknesses of two popular schemes, Gope et al.'s and Feng Zhu et al.'s schemes; based on our investigation, their schemes fail to achieve several security features and cannot withstand various attacks. Later, we propose a new scheme to resolve the problem their schemes and provide the solution for the RFID security problem generically. Analyzes informal and formal are used to ensure that our proposal fulfills security properties and withstands various attacks.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiawen Song ◽  
Meihua Xiao ◽  
Tong Zhang ◽  
Haoyang Zhou

AbstractPUF (Physical unclonable function) is a new hardware security primitive, and the research on PUFs is one of the emerging research focuses. For PUF-based mutual authentication protocols, a method to abstract the security properties of hardware by using logic of events is proposed, and the application aspects of logic of events are extended to protocols based on hardware security. With the interaction of PUF-based mutual authentication protocol formally described by logic of events, the basic sequences are constructed and the strong authentication property in protocol interaction process is verified. Based on the logic of events, the freshness of nonces is defined, and the persist rule is proposed according to the concept of freshness, which ensures the consistency of the protocol state and behavior predicate in the proof process, and reduces the complexity and redundancy in the protocol analysis process. Under reasonable assumptions, the security of the protocol is proven, and the fact that logic of events applies to PUF-based mutual authentication protocols is shown.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 155014771879512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madiha Khalid ◽  
Umar Mujahid ◽  
Muhammad Najam-ul-Islam

Internet of Things is one of the most important components of modern technological systems. It allows the real time synchronization and connectivity of devices with each other and with the rest of the world. The radio frequency identification system is used as node identification mechanism in the Internet of Thing networks. Since Internet of Things involve wireless channel for communication that is open for all types of malicious adversaries, therefore many security protocols have been proposed to ensure encryption over wireless channel. To reduce the overall cost of radio frequency identification enabled Internet of Thing network security, the researchers use simple bitwise logical operations such as XOR, AND, OR, and Rot and have proposed many ultralightweight mutual authentication protocols. However, almost all the previously proposed protocols were later found to be vulnerable against several attack models. Recently, a new ultralightweight mutual authentication protocol has been proposed which involves only XOR and Rotation functions in its design and claimed to be robust against all possible attack models. In this article, we have performed cryptanalysis of this recently proposed ultralightweight mutual authentication protocol and found many pitfalls and vulnerabilities in the protocol design. We have exploited weak structure of the protocol messages and proposed three attacks against the said protocol: one desynchronization and two full disclosure attacks.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bing-Chang Chen ◽  
Cheng-Ta Yang ◽  
Her-Tyan Yeh ◽  
Ching-Chao Lin

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