Person Deixis as Biased Political Pronouns in George W. Bush’s Speeches on Iraqi War II

Misrepresentation and manipulation in discourse can be weapons of mass deception. As politicians rely on language as their tool of trade, language users may opt for a language game to achieve their political ends. This is, in fact, the objective of the present study that focuses on the manipulation of person deixis in political discourse. The current research paper sheds light on the perception of Arabs and Muslims from a western perspective. More specifically, the speeches of George W. Bush, delivered between March 2003 and June 2004, and related to Iraqi War II, are analyzed within Fairclough's socio-cultural approach to CDA. The results of this study show that the use of political pronouns in G. W Bush's speeches reflects a WE\THEY dichotomy that divides the referents into pro-US and anti-US groups. The selection of pronouns distorts the truth and misrepresents the referents by allocating negative\pejorative words to them and categorizing them as proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. This research analyzes political pronouns in discourse within the framework of CDA and explains how person deixis is used in a language game to deceive public opinion.

Download Full-text

Covert Positive Incentives as an Alternative to War

Ethics & International Affairs ◽

10.1017/s0892679418000400 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 32 (3) ◽

pp. 293-303 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

James Pattison

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Public Opinion ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

International Society ◽

Prima Facie ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

Human Rights Abuses ◽

Military Action ◽

Prima Facie Duty

AbstractAlthough often overlooked, positive incentives can play a key role in tackling aggression, human rights abuses, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In this essay, I focus on one form of positive incentives: covert incentives. First, I argue that covert incentives are preferable to overt incentives since they enable policymakers to eschew the shackles of public opinion and avoid worries of moral hazard and the corruption of international society. Second, I argue that covert incentives are often more justifiable than covert force since they do not involve problematic methods and do not make it easier to undertake military action. Accordingly, I conclude that there is a prima facie duty to employ covert positive incentives as opposed to overt incentives and covert force.

Download Full-text