scholarly journals Effect of response format on cognitive reflection: Validating a two- and four-option multiple choice question version of the Cognitive Reflection Test

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 2511-2522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslav Sirota ◽  
Marie Juanchich
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslav Sirota ◽  
Marie Juanchich

The Cognitive Reflection Test, measuring intuition inhibition and cognitive reflection, has become extremely popular since it reliably predicts reasoning performance, decision-making and beliefs. Across studies, the response format of CRT items sometimes differs, assuming construct equivalence of the tests with open-ended vs. multiple choice items (the equivalence hypothesis). Evidence and theoretical reasons, however, suggest that the cognitive processes measured by these response formats and their associated performances might differ (the non-equivalence hypothesis). We tested the two hypotheses experimentally by assessing the performance in tests with different response formats and by comparing their predictive and construct validity. In a between-subjects experiment (n = 452), participants answered an open-ended, a two- or a four-option response format of stem-equivalent CRT items and completed tasks on belief bias, denominator neglect and paranormal beliefs (benchmark indicators of predictive validity) as well as actively open-minded thinking and numeracy (benchmark indicators of construct validity). We found no significant differences between the three response formats in the number of correct responses, the number of intuitive responses (with the exception of the two-option version being higher than the other tests) and in the correlational patterns with the indicators of predictive and construct validity. All three test versions were similarly reliable but the multiple-choice formats were completed more quickly. We speculate that the specific nature of the CRT items helps to build construct equivalence among the different response formats. We recommend using the validated multiple-choice version of the CRT presented here, particularly the four-option CRT, for practical and methodological reasons.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek ◽  
Przemysław Sawicki

Abstract. In this work, we investigated individual differences in cognitive reflection effects on delay discounting – a preference for smaller sooner over larger later payoff. People are claimed to prefer more these alternatives they considered first – so-called reference point – over the alternatives they considered later. Cognitive reflection affects the way individuals process information, with less reflective individuals relying predominantly on the first information they consider, thus, being more susceptible to reference points as compared to more reflective individuals. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that individuals who scored high on the Cognitive Reflection Test discount less strongly than less reflective individuals, but we also show that such individuals are less susceptible to imposed reference points. Experiment 2 replicated these findings additionally providing evidence that cognitive reflection predicts discounting strength and (in)dependency to reference points over and above individual difference in numeracy.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kilian James Garvey ◽  
Laura Folse ◽  
Crystal Curry

Author(s):  
Casey Wong ◽  
Paul Denny ◽  
Andrew Luxton-Reilly ◽  
Jacqueline Whalley

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110693
Author(s):  
Cyril Thomas ◽  
Marion Botella ◽  
André Didierjean

To facilitate our interactions with the surroundings, the human brain sometimes reshapes the situations that it faces in order to simplify them. This phenomenon has been widely studied in the context of reasoning, especially through the attribute substitution error. It has however been given much less attention in the field of perception. Recent research on the bat-and-ball problem suggests that reasoners are able to intuitively detect attribute substitution errors. Using a perceptual illusion drawn from the field of magic, we investigate the extent to which a perceptual form of attribute substitution depends on executive resources and can be detected. We also investigate the relationship between susceptibility to attribute substitution error in the flushtration count illusion and in a French adaptation of the bat-and ball problem. Finally, we investigate the link between the intuitive cognitive style (assessed by the Cognitive Reflection Test) and the susceptibility to the flushtration count illusion. Our results suggest that participants do not detect perceptual attribute substitution error, that this phenomenon could be independent of the executive resources allocated to the task, and could rest on mechanisms distinct from those that produce errors in reasoning. We discuss differences between these two phenomena, and factors that may explain them.


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