Cognitive Reflection Effects on Time Discounting

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek ◽  
Przemysław Sawicki

Abstract. In this work, we investigated individual differences in cognitive reflection effects on delay discounting – a preference for smaller sooner over larger later payoff. People are claimed to prefer more these alternatives they considered first – so-called reference point – over the alternatives they considered later. Cognitive reflection affects the way individuals process information, with less reflective individuals relying predominantly on the first information they consider, thus, being more susceptible to reference points as compared to more reflective individuals. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that individuals who scored high on the Cognitive Reflection Test discount less strongly than less reflective individuals, but we also show that such individuals are less susceptible to imposed reference points. Experiment 2 replicated these findings additionally providing evidence that cognitive reflection predicts discounting strength and (in)dependency to reference points over and above individual difference in numeracy.

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaja Damnjanović ◽  
Vera Novković ◽  
Irena Pavlović ◽  
Sandra Ilić ◽  
Slobodan Pantelić

The dual process framework posits that we reason using the quick System 1, and the deliberate System 2, both of which are part of our “adaptive toolbox”. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) estimates which system was used to solve a reasoning problem. Usually, the CRT tasks are solved incorrectly by using System 1, and correctly through System 2. We have applied the reference point hypothesis to the tasks of the CRT and proposed that this change would facilitate the switch between systems, resulting in better performance on the version of the test with a reference point, compared to the CRT without one. The results confirmed our assumptions, as evidenced by a generally higher score on the CRT with a reference point, albeit with different effects between items.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Edgcumbe

Abstract:Performance on Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to predict moral judgments concerning the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). This relationship is hypothesised to be mediated by the tendency toward thinking dispositions such as actively open-minded thinking (AOT), rational (REI-R) and experiential thinking (REI-E), and religiosity. The relationship between cognitive reflection, intuitive thinking and moral judgments with thinking dispositions are examined. As the MFQ measures five types of moral judgments which include ‘individualising values’ – harm and fairness, and ‘binding values’ - loyalty, authority and purity it was hypothesised that performance on these moral foundations would be influenced by thinking dispositions and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that the relationship between cognitive reflection and moral judgments were mediated differently by thinking dispositions. Religious participants and intuitive thinkers alike scored highly on binding moral values. Analytic thinkers and non-religious participants scored highly on individualising moral values. The data is consistent with religiosity and intuition being inherently linked and suggests that moral values are influenced by individual differences in thinking dispositions and cognitive style.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-145
Author(s):  
Predrag Teovanović

The study aimed to examine several assumptions of dual process theories of reasoning by employing individual difference approach. A set of categorical syllogisms was administered to a relatively large sample of participants (N = 247) along with attached confidence rating scales, and measures of intelligence and cognitive reflection. As expected, response accuracy on syllogistic reasoning tasks highly depended on task complexity and the status of belief-logic conflict, thus demonstrating beliefbias on the group level. Individual difference analyses showed that more biased subject also performed poorer on Raven's Matrices (r = .25) and Cognitive Reflection Test (r = .27), which is in line with assumptions that willingness to engage and capacities to carry out type 2 processes both contribute to understanding of rational thinking. Moreover, measures of cognitive decoupling were significantly correlated with the performance on conflict syllogisms (r = .20). Individual differences in sensitivity to conflict detection, on the other side, were not related to reasoning accuracy in general (r = .02). Yet, additional analyses showed that noteworthy correlation between these two can be observed for easier syllogistic reasoning tasks (r = .26). Such results indicate that boundary conditions of conflict detection should be viewed as a function of both tasks' and participants' characteristics.


2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 470-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Abeler ◽  
Armin Falk ◽  
Lorenz Goette ◽  
David Huffman

A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is: what determines the reference point? One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based, reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low. (JEL D12, D84, J22)


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (7) ◽  
pp. 1011-1022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oshin Vartanian ◽  
Erin L. Beatty ◽  
Ingrid Smith ◽  
Kristen Blackler ◽  
Quan Lam ◽  
...  

Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC's possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Niraj Patel

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has quickly become a popular measure of individual differences in propensity to reflect versus rely on intuition (Frederick, 2005). The test consists of three questions, and it has been found to be associated with many different every day beliefs, such as religious beliefs, and performance on heuristics and biases tasks. As such, it has dominated recent theorizing about individual differences in intuitive/reflective thinking propensities. However, it is unclear whether these questions primarily measure individual differences in reflective versus intuitive thinking propensities, versus numeracy, or even another cognitive skill such as cognitive restructuring (i.e. the ability to reframe problems). The present research examined the extent to which the CRT performance can be attributed to individual differences in intuitive/reflective thinking propensities, versus other factors such as numeracy and/or insight problem solving ability, by observing whether presenting the correct answers in multiple-choice format without the "intuitive" answers would make the problems trivially easy or if many participants would still be unable to solve the problems correctly. Furthermore, it sought to determine whether the CRT's associations with other judgments and beliefs (e.g. religiosity, paranormal beliefs, etc.) can be explained by its assessment of intuition/reflection or one of these other factors. Results indicate that performance on the CRT is multiply determined, with numeracy and insight problem solving ability also being primary factors. Furthermore, numeracy in particular could help explain some differences in everyday beliefs. Keywords: Cognitive Reflection, Intuition, Numeracy, Insight, Beliefs, Judgments


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Burič ◽  
Jakub Šrol

Studies on individual differences in susceptibility to cognitive biases have identified several cognitive dispositions which were thought to predict reasoning by contributing to the efficiency of analytic thought. Recently formulated hybrid models, however, suggest that substantial differences between reasoners may arise early already in the intuitive stages of the reasoning process. To address this possibility, we examined standard individual difference measures, mindware instantiation, and conflict detection efficiency as predictors of the accuracy on conflict reasoning problems presented under a two-response paradigm. This was intended to tease apart the predictors of intuitive responding from those factors which only contribute to reasoning when participants have enough time for analytic engagement. We found that participants correctly solved almost half of conflict reasoning problems already at the initial response stage and that the individual differences in initial reasoning performance were predicted by their cognitive reflection, mindware instantiation, and detection efficiency. The findings advance the specification of hybrid dual-process models and provide corroborating evidence that a part of the link between bias susceptibility and cognitive dispositions is due to differences in intuitive processing.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Burič ◽  
Ľubica Konrádová

Following the growing body of evidence suggesting that substantial individual differences in reasoning exist already at early stages of the reasoning process and that reasoners might be able to produce logical intuitions, the model of mindware automatization posits that the mindware acquired to the extent that it is fully automatized can cue the logically correct type 1 response. In this study, we asked participants to solve the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) presented under the two-response paradigm. Among individual difference factors, we measured mindware instantiation and conflict detection efficiency. These variables explained approximately 10% of the variance in the accuracy of intuitive answers. We also observed that in more than half of cases, the correct response was already correct at the initial response stage. These results are in line with the theoretical model of mindware automatization to a large extent and raise a question about the main attribute of the CRT. Keywords: cognitive reflection, mindware, conflict detection, logical intuition, two-response paradigm


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 191-195
Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Kelley ◽  
Adrienne L. Crowell

Abstract. Two studies tested the hypothesis that self-reported sense of smell (i.e., metacognitive insight into one’s olfactory ability) predicts disgust sensitivity and disgust reactivity. Consistent with our predictions two studies demonstrated that disgust correlates with self-reported sense of smell. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated, from an individual difference perspective, that trait-like differences in disgust relate to self-reported sense of smell. Physical forms of disgust (i.e., sexual and pathogen disgust) drove this association. However, the association between self-reported sense of smell and disgust sensitivity is small, suggesting that it is likely not a good proxy for disgust sensitivity. The results of Study 2 extended this finding by demonstrating that individual differences in self-reported sense of smell influence how individuals react to a disgusting olfactory stimulus. Those who reported having a better sense of smell (or better insight into their olfactory ability) found a disgusting smell significantly more noxious as compared to participants reporting having a poor sense of smell (or poor insight into their olfactory ability). The current findings suggest that a one-item measure of self-reported sense of smell may be an effective tool in disgust research.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kilian James Garvey ◽  
Laura Folse ◽  
Crystal Curry

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