scholarly journals The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining

Econometrica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 837-865
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Bastianello ◽  
Marco LiCalzi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Acceptance Probability ◽  
Product Operator ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
The Nash Solution ◽  
Axiomatic Bargaining

We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability‐based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.

The Nash solution and Independence of Revealed Irrelevant Alternatives

1994 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Mariotti
Keyword(s):  
Nash Solution ◽  
The Nash Solution

An Empirical Bargaining Model with Left-Digit Bias: A Study on Auto Loan Monthly Payments

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenling Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Large Data ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Lower Interest Rate ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

This paper studies price bargaining when both parties have left-digit bias when processing numbers. The empirical analysis focuses on the auto finance market in the United States, using a large data set of 35 million auto loans. Incorporating left-digit bias in bargaining is motivated by several intriguing observations. The scheduled monthly payments of auto loans bunch at both $9- and $0-ending digits, especially over $100 marks. In addition, $9-ending loans carry a higher interest rate, and $0-ending loans have a lower interest rate. We develop a Nash bargaining model that allows for left-digit bias from both consumers and finance managers of auto dealers. Results suggest that both parties are subject to this basic human bias: the perceived difference between $9- and the next $0-ending payments is larger than $1, especially between $99- and $00-ending payments. The proposed model can explain the phenomena of payments bunching and differential interest rates for loans with different ending digits. We use counterfactuals to show a nuanced impact of left-digit bias, which can both increase and decrease the payments. Overall, bias from both sides leads to a $33 increase in average payment per loan compared with a benchmark case with no bias. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.

Consistent Conjectural Variations Coincide with the Nash Solution in the Meta-Model

2020 ◽  
pp. 29-40
Author(s):  
José Guadalupe Flores Muñiz ◽  
Nataliya Kalashnykova ◽  
Viacheslav V. Kalashnikov ◽  
Vladik Kreinovich
Keyword(s):  
Nash Solution ◽  
Meta Model ◽  
Conjectural Variations ◽  
The Nash Solution

A Sensitivity Based Approach to Determining Non-Cooperative Solutions in Nash and Stackelberg Games

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehsan Ghotbi ◽  
Wilkistar A. Otieno ◽  
Anoop K. Dhingra
Keyword(s):  
Response Surface Methodology ◽  
Computational Effort ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Numerical Errors ◽  
Multiobjective Problems ◽  
Cooperative Solutions ◽  
The One ◽  
Rational Reaction Set ◽  
The Nash Solution

A sensitivity based approach is presented to determine Nash solution(s) in multiobjective problems modeled as a non-cooperative game. The proposed approach provides an approximation to the rational reaction set (RRS) for each player. An intersection of these sets yields the Nash solution for the game. An alternate approach for generating the RRS based on design of experiments (DOE) combined with response surface methodology (RSM) is also explored. The two approaches for generating RRS are compared on three example problems to find Nash and Stackelberg solutions. It is seen that the proposed sensitivity based approach (i) requires less computational effort than a RSM-DOE approach, (ii) is less prone to numerical errors than the RSM-DOE approach, (iii) is able to find all Nash solutions when the Nash solution is not a singleton, (iv) is able to approximate non linear RRS, and (v) is able to find better a Nash solution on an example problem than the one reported in the literature.

Bargaining and Justice

1985 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Nash Solution

My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.

A Nash bargaining model for flow shop scheduling problem under uncertainty: a case study from tire manufacturing in Iran

2018 ◽  
Vol 96 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 531-546
Author(s):  
Ghasem Safari ◽  
Ashkan Hafezalkotob ◽  
Mohammad Khalilzadeh
Keyword(s):  
Flow Shop ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Flow Shop Scheduling ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Scheduling Problem ◽  
Shop Scheduling
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document