Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games
Keyword(s):
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite‐player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non‐atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite‐player games.
1996 ◽
Vol 21
(3)
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pp. 726-733
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2003 ◽
Vol 31
(4)
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pp. 493-498
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2011 ◽
Vol 214
(1)
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pp. 91-98
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2008 ◽
Vol 23
(2)
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pp. 361-371
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