Le Grand, Antoine (1629–99)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia A. Easton
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Cartesian System ◽  
Innate Ideas

Le Grand was the foremost expositor and popularizer of Cartesian philosophy in England during the seventeenth century. He wrote on ethics, politics, logic and numerous scientific topics. His Cartesian system is one of the most complete, emphasizing mind–body dualism and interaction, innate ideas, mechanism and method. His theory of signification is important in the Cartesian debate on ideas.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Platt
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Nicolas Malebranche ◽  
Historical Figure ◽  
Islamic Thought ◽  
Cartesian System ◽  
The Relationship

Starting in the 1660s, a number of philosophers argued for occasionalism, a doctrine that was first developed in medieval Islamic thought. The seventeenth-century thinkers who revived occasionalism—including Arnold Geulincx, Louis de la Forge, Gerauld de Cordemoy, and, most famously, Nicolas Malebranche—were deeply influenced by the philosophy of Descartes. This book will consider the relationship between Cartesianism and occasionalism, and examine the arguments that led Descartes’ followers to endorse occasionalism. It argues that the Cartesian occasionalists chose to adopt occasionalism as a way to defend and develop the Cartesian system—and that these theoretical motivations are crucial to understanding the force of their arguments for occasionalism. In order to understand the goals or motives of a historical figure such as Descartes or Malebranche, we can compare that figure to his or her historical counterparts. This Introduction explains the concept of a counterpart, following David Lewis.

La Forge, Louis de (1632–66)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Nadler
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Medical Doctor ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Cartesian System ◽  
Mind And Body

Louis de la Forge, a medical doctor by profession, was an important champion of Cartesian philosophy in mid-seventeenth century France. Through his work on the first published edition of Descartes’ Traité de l’homme, as well as in his own Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, La Forge sought to complete Descartes’ project of giving a full and detailed account of the human being as a union of two essentially distinct substances: mind and body. His analysis of causation introduced occasionalist elements into his otherwise orthodox Cartesian system, and he is credited with being one of the originators of occasionalism.

scholarly journals Herbert of Cherbury, Descartes and Locke on Innate Ideas and Universal Consent

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-115
Author(s):  
Mattia Mantovani ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Innate Ideas ◽  
The Common

The present paper investigates the seventeenth-century debate on whether the agreement of all human beings upon certain notions—designated as the “common” ones—prove these notions to be innate. It does so by focusing on Descartes’ and Locke’s rejections of the philosophy of Herbert of Cherbury, one of the most important early modern proponents of this view. The paper opens by considering the strategy used in Herbert’s arguments, as well as the difficulties involved in them. It shows that Descartes’ 1638 and 1639 reading of Herbert’s On Truth—both the 1633 second Latin edition and Mersenne’s 1639 translation—was instrumental in shaping Descartes’ views on the issue. The arguments of Locke’s Essay opposing Herbert’s case for innatism are thus revealed to be ineffective against the case which Descartes makes for this same doctrine, since Descartes had in fact framed his conception of innateness in opposition to the very same theses as Locke was arguing against. The paper concludes by explaining how two thinkers as antithetical as Locke and Descartes came to agree on at least one point, and a truly crucial one: namely, that universal consent counts as a criterion neither for innatism nor for truth.

Innate Ideas

1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
R. Edgley
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Striking Resemblance ◽  
Is Research ◽  
Contemporary Research ◽  
Innate Ideas ◽  
The Mind

Empiricism, the philosophical theory that all our ideas and knowledge are derived from experience, has in recent years been the target of radical and persuasive objections. In the seventeenth century, and for long after, rationalism seemed the only alternative to empiricism, but, like Kant, many contemporary philosophers have been convinced that empiricism and rationalism are equally unacceptable, and that both positions, and the conflict between them, are the result of trying to answer confused, misleading, and perhaps senseless questions. Of all the traditional theories in particular, none, I suppose, has looked to modern philosophers less capable of being revived than the rationalist doctrine of innate ideas: the doctrine that some at least of our ideas and knowledge of things are not derived from outside the mind, through experience, but are present from birth in the mind itself and thus represent the mind's own contribution to our understanding of reality. What Strawson has called ‘those old and picturesque debates regarding the origin of our ideas’ seemed to have become museum pieces, charming, as antiques can be, but with little relevance to current issues. These complacent attitudes, if that is what they are, have been rudely disturbed by Chomsky and his colleagues. Chomsky has suggested ‘that contemporary research supports a theory of psychological a priori principles that bears a striking resemblance to the classical doctrine of innate ideas’. In the prevailing situation, the novelty of this suggestion is twofold. It is not only that the theory of innate ideas may be true after all, but also that the support alleged for the ancient doctrine has a distinctively modern look. The research that Chomsky claims supports the doctrine is research in the empirical science of linguistics. The implication is that empiricism is refutable empirically, and more generally that a philosophical dispute such as the dispute between empiricism and rationalism, once it is made clear, can be settled by science.

John Locke: Natural Law and Innate Ideas

Dialogue ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.B. Drury
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Natural Laws ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Innate Ideas ◽  
Essay Concerning Human Understanding

In the seventeenth century, the concept of natural law was linked with that of “innate ideas”. Natural laws were said to be ideas imprinted by nature or by God on men's minds and were the very foundation of religion and morality. Locke's attack on innate ideas in the first book of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is therefore considered to be an assault on natural law. Modern critics like Peter Laslett, W. von Leyden and Philip Abrams are of the opinion that Locke's critique of innate ideas in the Essay cannot be reconciled with the concept of natural law in the Two Treatises of Government.

Innate Ideas

1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
R. Edgley
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Striking Resemblance ◽  
Is Research ◽  
Contemporary Research ◽  
Innate Ideas ◽  
The Mind

Empiricism, the philosophical theory that all our ideas and knowledge are derived from experience, has in recent years been the target of radical and persuasive objections. In the seventeenth century, and for long after, rationalism seemed the only alternative to empiricism, but, like Kant, many contemporary philosophers have been convinced that empiricism and rationalism are equally unacceptable, and that both positions, and the conflict between them, are the result of trying to answer confused, misleading, and perhaps senseless questions. Of all the traditional theories in particular, none, I suppose, has looked to modern philosophers less capable of being revived than the rationalist doctrine of innate ideas: the doctrine that some at least of our ideas and knowledge of things are not derived from outside the mind, through experience, but are present from birth in the mind itself and thus represent the mind's own contribution to our understanding of reality. What Strawson has called ‘those old and picturesque debates regarding the origin of our ideas’ seemed to have become museum pieces, charming, as antiques can be, but with little relevance to current issues. These complacent attitudes, if that is what they are, have been rudely disturbed by Chomsky and his colleagues. Chomsky has suggested ‘that contemporary research supports a theory of psychological a priori principles that bears a striking resemblance to the classical doctrine of innate ideas’. In the prevailing situation, the novelty of this suggestion is twofold. It is not only that the theory of innate ideas may be true after all, but also that the support alleged for the ancient doctrine has a distinctively modern look. The research that Chomsky claims supports the doctrine is research in the empirical science of linguistics. The implication is that empiricism is refutable empirically, and more generally that a philosophical dispute such as the dispute between empiricism and rationalism, once it is made clear, can be settled by science.

Anne Viscountess Conway: A Seventeenth Century Rationalist

Hypatia ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Duran
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cartesian System ◽  
Cambridge Platonists

The work of Spinoza, Descartes and Leibniz is cited in an attempt to develop, both expositorily and critically, the philosophy of Anne Viscountess Conway. Broadly, it is contended that Conway's metaphysics, epistemology and account of the passions not only bear intriguing comparison with the work of the other well-known rationalists, but supersede them in some ways, particularly insofar as the notions of substance and ontological hierarchy are concerned. Citing the commentary of Loptson and Carolyn Merchant, and alluding to other commentary on the Cambridge Platonists whose work was done in tandem with Conway's, it is contended that Conway's conception of the “monad” preceded and influenced Leibniz's, and that her monistic vitalism was in many respects a superior metaphysics to the Cartesian system. It is concluded that we owe Conway more attention and celebration than she has thus far received.

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