Malebranche’s Case for Occasionalism

Malebranche develops the most comprehensive case for occasionalism of the early modern occasionalists; he also motivates occasionalism in the context of an overall philosophical and theological system. This chapter analyzes Malebranche’s arguments for occasionalism, including his version of the argument based on the Quod Nescis principle, and his argument based on the principle that there is a necessary connection between a cause and its effect. Section 8.5 argues that he takes these metaphysical principles to be self-evident. Though he thinks we can fail to be certain of their truth, we can assure ourselves of their certainty by reflecting on how these principles cohere with the best overall philosophical and theological world-view. Malebranche highlights the theological implications of his conclusion that “there is only one cause.” Section 8.6 shows that occasionalism also plays a crucial role in Malebranche’s philosophical project, especially in connection with his theory of the Vision in God.

La Forge

Chapter 6 argues that La Forge is a “partial” occasionalist, who appeals to “body–body” occasionalism to defend Descartes’ central epistemic thesis that mind is better known than body. La Forge argues for an occasionalistic version of Descartes’ physics. However, La Forge presents a theory of the mind–body union that implies that the human mind and body causally interact. While he says bodies are the “only occasional causes” of sensations in the mind, he uses “occasional cause” to refer to a type of accidental efficient cause. La Forge’s arguments for occasionalism are limited to body–body interaction: Although he holds that God continually re-creates finite substances, he is not committed to full-blown occasionalism. La Forge does not adopt occasionalism simply because he takes it to be a logical consequence of Cartesian physics. He sees body–body occasionalism as playing a broader theoretical role: He uses it to respond to criticisms of Cartesian epistemology.

Mind–Body Interactionism

Chapter 3 argues that Descartes’ views about mind–body interaction are internally consistent, and compatible with his more general views about causation; thus neither Descartes nor his followers were forced to reject interactionism to maintain mind–body dualism. In some later works, Descartes says that corporeal motions “give occasion” to the mind to form ideas, which are innate to the mind. Section 3.3 argues that these remarks are consistent with his claims in earlier texts that corporeal motions produce or bring about ideas in the mind. This causal theory of sensation seems to be inconsistent with general causal principles that Descartes endorses elsewhere—such as the principle that a cause must contain, “formally or eminently,” whatever it brings about in its effect. But sections 3.3 and 3.4 show that Descartes’ general statements about efficient causation are compatible with the view that bodily motions have the power to elicit sensations in the mind.

Introduction

Starting in the 1660s, a number of philosophers argued for occasionalism, a doctrine that was first developed in medieval Islamic thought. The seventeenth-century thinkers who revived occasionalism—including Arnold Geulincx, Louis de la Forge, Gerauld de Cordemoy, and, most famously, Nicolas Malebranche—were deeply influenced by the philosophy of Descartes. This book will consider the relationship between Cartesianism and occasionalism, and examine the arguments that led Descartes’ followers to endorse occasionalism. It argues that the Cartesian occasionalists chose to adopt occasionalism as a way to defend and develop the Cartesian system—and that these theoretical motivations are crucial to understanding the force of their arguments for occasionalism. In order to understand the goals or motives of a historical figure such as Descartes or Malebranche, we can compare that figure to his or her historical counterparts. This Introduction explains the concept of a counterpart, following David Lewis.

Geulincx

Chapter 5 shows how Geulincx uses occasionalism to develop a virtue ethics that is consistent with both Cartesian metaphysics and Christian teaching. Section 5.1 surveys Geulincx’s main arguments for occasionalism, and argues that Geulincx did not see occasionalism as providing an explanation of mind–body interaction. Section 5.2 focuses on an underlying assumption of one of Geulincx’s arguments, namely the principle, “Quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis.” Section 5.2 argues that Geulincx takes this principle to be self-evident (and not justified on the basis of an underlying theory of causation, on which all agency is volitional). Section 5.3 shows how Geulincx took this principle to cohere with Cartesianism, and explains the role of occasionalism in his account of the virtue of humility. Section 5.4 concludes that Geulincx uses occasionalism to defend the compatibility of Cartesian metaphysics with Christian theology, and to supplement Cartesianism with a theory of moral virtue.

Cordemoy

Cordemoy was the first of the Cartesians to argue in print for occasionalism about both body–body and mind–body causation—however, chapter 7 argues that Cordemoy had motives for adopting occasionalism similar to those of Geulincx and La Forge. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 present Cordemoy’s arguments for body–body and mind–body occasionalism. (Section 7.3 examines his account of the mind–body union, and argues his view about body–mind causation is unclear.) Geulincx’s overriding argument for body–body occasionalism is based on theses from Cartesian physics, including Descartes’ claim that motion is a mode of body, and the thesis that a mode of one substance cannot be transferred to another substance. But section 7.4 argues that Cordemoy’s occasionalism is not just a logical result of these metaphysical principles. Section 7.5 concludes that (like La Forge) Cordemoy also used occasionalism to defend Descartes’ epistemology, and thus had a broader theoretical motive for adopting occasionalism.

Cartesian Physics

Chapter 2 argues that Descartes’ physics is compatible with the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. Descartes holds that God preserves bodies in existence, continually recreating them in different positions over time. Section 2.1 argues that it follows that (on Descartes’ view) God causes all the motions that occur in the world. Some of Descartes’ interpreters take Descartes’ physics to imply that mere bodies do not have any motive force or power, that is, any ability either to move themselves, or to cause motion in other bodies. Descartes’ physics thus seems to imply body–body occasionalism. Yet sections 2.2 and 2.3 show that Descartes is not committed to this conclusion. Instead, section 2.3 argues that Descartes thinks that bodies are “secondary causes” of motion that have active causal powers. Section 2.4 shows how this concurrentist reading of Descartes’ physics is consistent with his conception of body as extended substance.

Clauberg

Chapter 4 uses Clauberg’s theory of the mind–body union to show how a Cartesian thinker could respond to perceived problems with Descartes’ interactionism without adopting occasionalism. Section 4.1 presents Clauberg’s theory, according to which the mind is a “moral cause” of motions in the body, and corporal motions are “procatarctic causes” of ideas in the mind. Section 4.2 shows how Clauberg reconciles this account with the causal principles that “an effect may not be more noble than its cause,” and that a cause must formally or eminently contain whatever it brings about in its effect. Section 4.3 argues that Clauberg takes moral and procatarctic causes to be types of efficient causes. This is consistent with a broad conception of efficient causation, which section 4.4 argues Clauberg came to hold by the 1660s. The position that emerges thus represents an alternative to that of Cartesian occasionalists, such as Geulincx and Malebranche.

The Doctrine of Occasionalism

Chapter 1 explains the doctrine of occasionalism. Section 1.1 unpacks the occasionalist claim that God is the only efficient cause, by explaining the concept of an efficient cause, as it was typically understood in medieval and early modern texts. Section 1.2 contrasts occasionalism with a theory of divine providence developed by Thomas Aquinas, which says that God “concurs” with the actions of created substances. Section 1.3 clarifies the difference between occasionalism and the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence using the notion of a causal power: According to this analysis, occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. Malebranche expresses this claim by saying that created beings are “occasional causes” that merely “give occasion” to God’s actions. However, section 1.4 argues that there is also a Scholastic tradition that uses terms such as “occasion” and “occasional cause” to refer to a type of true efficient cause.