Moral scepticism

Author(s):  
Mark T. Nelson

Scepticism in general is the view that we can have little or no knowledge; thus moral scepticism is the view that we can have little or no moral knowledge. Some moral sceptics argue that we cannot have moral knowledge because we cannot get the evidence necessary to justify any moral judgments. More radical moral sceptics argue that we cannot have moral knowledge because in morality there are no truths to be known. These radical sceptics argue either that moral judgments are all false because they erroneously presuppose the real existence of ‘objective values’, or that moral judgments aim to express feelings or influence behaviour instead of stating truths. Critics of moral scepticism, in turn, argue that in at least some cases moral judgments aim to state truths, some of these judgments are in fact true, and we have enough evidence to say that we know these moral truths.

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin F. Landy

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.


Author(s):  
Alvyra Galkiene

This article analyses how fundamental values underpin educational practices that have emerged in the development of society and create the preconditions for the sustainability of inclusive education. Through the analysis of the scholarly literature, the expression of inclusive values in the application of approaches to integrated, individualised inclusive education and Universal Design for Learning is analysed. It has been established that the effectiveness of inclusive education is substantiated in practices which are based on real existing inclusive values: equity, equality, communality and respect for diversity. Based on the results of the study, it is concluded that the sustainability of inclusive education coincides with the real existence of inclusive values in practice, equally applying to all students.


Author(s):  
Jeremy Catto

John Wyclif was a logician, theologian and religious reformer. A Yorkshireman educated at Oxford, he was first prominent as a logician; he developed some technical notions of the Oxford Calculators, but reacted against their logic of terms to embrace with fervour the idea of the real existence of universal ideas. He expounded his view as a theologian, rejecting the notion of the annihilation of substance (including the eucharistic elements) and treating time as merely contingent. The proper understanding of universals became his touchstone of moral progress; treating scripture as a universal idea, he measured the value of human institutions, including the Church and its temporal property, by their conformity with its absolute truth. These views, though temporarily favoured by King Edward III, were condemned by Pope Gregory XI in 1377 and by the English ecclesiastical hierarchy in 1382, forcing him into retirement but leaving him the inspirer of a clandestine group of scholarly reformers, the Lollards.


2012 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-136
Author(s):  
Henry Wells Sullivan ◽  
Luciana da Cunha Monteiro

Author(s):  
Terence Cuneo

The “debunker’s puzzle” asks how it could be that (i) moral non-naturalism is true, (ii) we have moral knowledge, and (iii) evolutionary forces have heavily shaped the workings of our moral faculty. This chapter begins by exploring a prominent attempt to dissolve the puzzle, so-called third-factor views, arguing that they are subject to a variety of objections. This discussion highlights a pivotal claim in the dialectic between debunkers and non-naturalists: the debunker’s puzzle has force against moral non-naturalism only if it incorporates an ambitious claim about how far evolutionary forces have operated on the workings of the moral faculty. Non-naturalists can plausibly reject such a strong claim. Still, debunkers can rightly reply that non-naturalists nonetheless lack an explanation regarding how our moral judgments are linked to normative reality. The chapter argues that, by appealing to constitutive explanations, non-naturalists have helpful things to say about what the link might be.


1993 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Maldonado

The spicule complement of a demosponge specimen collected from the Atlantic coast of Spain was noted to be similar to that of Pachastrella monilifera, but particularly characterized by the presence of short-shafted mesotriaenes. After detailed examination, it was concluded that the specimen undoubtedly belonged to the species Pachastrella ovisternata Von Lendenfeld, 1894. For a long time, this species has been regarded a synonym of Pachastrella monilifera Schmidt, 1868. Examination of this new specimen showed that Pachastrella ovisternata was a valid species of the genus Pachastrella. Moreover, it denoted the real existence of mesotriaenes in this genus.


1981 ◽  
Vol 31 (123) ◽  
pp. 177
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield ◽  
Renford Bambrough

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